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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF URBAN FORTIFICATION ON PUBLIC SPACE 
 
by 
Ryan Anderson 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Donald Green 
 
This dissertation contributes to empirical studies on the spatial extent and intensity of 
urban fortification/security zones and their influence on urban public space.  Urban 
public space has been based on creating open and safe environments for city dwellers.  
However, ultra-secure urban spaces have been found to filter citizens, restrict movement, 
and modify individual behavior.  This first part of this study determines where security 
zones manifest themselves, quantify the fortification of the security zones, and measure 
the intensity of these spaces in three major U.S. cities.  The second part of the study 
offers an explanation of how social and commercial activity is being affected by security 
zones.      
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The Effect of Urban Fortification on Public Space 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 On the morning of April 19
th
, 1995, Timothy McVeigh awoke in a rental truck 
parked near a roadside motel in northern Oklahoma.  As he drove into downtown 
Oklahoma City, he placed earplugs in his ears and continued to drive.  He stopped briefly 
to light the first of two fuses connected to the bomb.  Soon after, he lit the second fuse 
while stopped at a red light. 
 McVeigh parked the Ryder rental truck near the delivery dock in front of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.  He exited the truck and locked all the doors of the 
vehicle, then casually walked away from the building.  The people inside of the Murrah 
Federal Building and within the surrounding area, were unaware of what was about to 
unfold that Wednesday morning.  At 9:02 AM the bomb detonated with the explosion 
obliterating the front half of the Murrah Federal Building.  McVeigh would later recall 
that he was lifted an inch off the ground by the blast.  Soon after the blast McVeigh was 
in his car heading out of the city.   
 The Murrah Federal Building housed numerous federal agencies including the 
Drug Enforcement Agency, United States Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
and Firearms, General Services Administration, Department of the Army, Department of 
Defense, Federal Highway Administration, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, Labor Department, and the Veterans Administration.  The explosion 
disrupted governmental services and destroyed the lives of clerks, secretaries, federal law 
enforcement officers, citizens, and children. 
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 According to the Oklahoma City Department of Civil Emergency Management 
After Action Report (1996), when the bomb detonated, approximately 600 employees 
and 250 visitors were in the building.  The blast and resulting collateral damage at the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building killed 168 people and injured over 800 other people.  
The force of the bomb leveled the north face of the building, and caused extensive 
damage to all nine floors of the building.  After the dust settled, the building lay in ruins.  
The explosion also crippled downtown Oklahoma City. 
 The concussion of the blast damaged over 300 surrounding buildings, overturned 
automobiles, shattered windows, started fires, and blew out doors in a 50 block radius.  
More than 400 individuals were left homeless in the surrounding area.  Approximately 
7,000 people lost their workplace.  It was reported that the blast was felt 55 miles from 
the blast site and registered a 6.0 on the Richter scale.  Not only did the terrorist attack 
cause considerable physical devastation and death, the attack also caused a significant 
amount of psychological and emotional toll on the estimated 16,000 people in the 
downtown area at the time of the explosion.  The Oklahoma City bombing marked the 
beginning of a national approach to security planning and building design to combat 
terrorist acts.  
Soon after the Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City, the U.S. 
General Services Administration was tasked with providing guidelines to secure areas in 
and around federal buildings and courthouses (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005).  The 
agency embarked on a nationwide effort to secure its nearly 1,800 federal buildings, 
courthouses, and other government stations.  After the inventory, public buildings began 
to close streets, place concrete barriers in plazas, and install numerous security devices to 
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provide a much more secure public building.  Other recommendations by General 
Services Administration included: landscape design elements; site planning and access; 
vehicle circulation; standoff distance; hardening of building exteriors; window glazing to 
reduce flying debris; and engineering design to prevent progressive collapse (Nadel, 
2004).  However, the Oklahoma City Bombing was not the last terrorist attack 
experienced on U.S. soil.    
On September 11, 2001 at 7:59 AM, American Airlines Flight 11 took off from 
Boston’s Logan Airport bound for Los Angeles.  Everything about the flight was routine 
until 8:14 AM, when American 11 had its last routine communication with Boston’s air 
traffic control center.  Shortly after that Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, stabbed two 
flight attendants in the first class section of the plane (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  It is speculated the Shehri brothers were able to 
gain access to the cockpit after stabbing the two flight attendants and slashing the throat 
of another passenger.   
Shortly after this incident, Mohamed Atta, the only terrorist trained to fly an 
airplane, moved to the cockpit from his business class seat.  After Atta was seated at the 
controls, the remaining hijackers sprayed pepper spray, or some other type of irritant, in 
the first class section, forcing all the passengers to the rear of the plane.  Five minutes 
from the hijacking, flight attendants, Betty Ong and Amy Sweeny, contacted an 
American Airlines Services Office and relayed information about the events taking place.      
At 8:26 AM, Ong reported that the plane was flying erratically.  One minute later, 
American 11 turned south for New York.  Ong and Sweeny continued to relay seat 
numbers and descriptions of the hijackers to American Airlines Control Center personnel.  
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At 8:41 AM, Sweeney reported the plane was in rapid decent.  At this time air traffic 
controllers declared American 11 hijacked and began rerouting air traffic so American 11 
could land at John F. Kennedy International Airport.  At 8:43 AM, Mohamed Atta made 
his final turn towards Manhattan.  At 8:44 AM, Sweeney frantically reported to the 
American Airlines Control Center, “Oh my God we are way too low!” Seconds later the 
phone call ended.  At 8:46 AM, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World 
Trade Center.      
The aftermath of the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks left 2,996 people dead with 
over 6,000 more injured.  World Trade Center’s 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Fitterman Hall, 
Deutsche Bank Building, and St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church were all destroyed 
with dozens of other buildings damaged in the attack (FEMA, 2002).  However, the 
crumbling of the twin towers will forever be engrained into the minds of U.S. citizens.  
Preventing another terrorist attack became top priority of the U.S. government (Heyman 
and Ridge, 2006).   
The Patriot Act was the first major piece of legislation passed in response to the 
September 11
th
 attacks.  In the year after the attacks, Congress passed more than 130 
pieces of legislation related to combating terrorism.  Such legislation included the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
Entry Reform Act.  The government also created the Department of Homeland Security, 
which is the third largest agency in the U.S. government.  More than 260 government 
agencies were either created or reorganized following the terrorist attacks (Priest and 
Arkin, 2010).  More than 1,200 government organizations and 1,900 private companies 
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engage in work related to counter-terrorism, homeland security, and intelligence (Priest 
and Arkin, 2010).  Budgets for anti-terrorism and defense related matters also rose.   
  Often in times of emergency or disaster, governments utilize architecture to 
reassert their power and authority (Dovey, 2001).   After the September 11
th
 terrorist 
attacks, New York’s Lower Manhattan was encased in Jersey barriers and chain link 
fencing (Sorkin, 2008).  Throughout the country, makeshift security improvements were 
designed with the sole purpose of improving the safety of the building and its occupants, 
with little to no regard for social, economic, transportation, or aesthetic consideration.  
The open areas surrounding these buildings have been scenes for farmers markets, 
outdoor concerts, and picnics.  With the implementation of these new security measures 
these public uses have nearly been eliminated.  These new spaces often resemble sterile 
fortress like spaces and are known as security zones (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005).   
Such terrorist attacks add further momentum to an already apparent militarization 
and fortification of urban public space in many U.S. cites (Coaffee, 2009).  In the U.S., 
terrorism has been portrayed as a threat to freedom, democracy, and civilization; only 
countered by a need to fortify cities coupled by military action across the globe (Coaffee, 
2009, Marcuse, 2006, Graham, 2007).  Graham (2007) states the systemic fortification of 
our cities is closely related to continuing social polarization, urban sprawl, continued 
expansion of fortified enclaves, and a growing culture of fear.   
Exploiting the culture of fear are security industries and experts who profit from 
providing municipalities and businesses services in communications, sensing, tracking, 
and surveillance systems.  Shortly after September 11
th
, Mike Davis predicted that 
military and security companies of the new “fear economy” would quickly capitalize on 
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the nation’s nervousness of future terrorist attacks in urban areas (Davis, 2001).  Marcuse 
(2006) notes, with the threat of terrorism, the security industry is now one of the fastest 
growing sectors of the U.S. economy.  Since the Oklahoma City Bombing, Washington 
D.C. has become the epicenter of a type of security industrial complex (Hoffman and 
Chalk, 2002).   
 Defensive urban design can minimize the damage of a terrorist strike on key 
urban spaces (FEMA, 2011).  For example, bollards can be erected around building 
perimeters to increase standoff distance between a truck bomb and the building, thereby 
reducing the potential damage to the building.  However, any secured boundary will 
always remain semi-accessible to any determined terrorist.  These security zones also 
interfere with the fundamental accessibility of contemporary cities.   
Cities are based on the freedom of movement and interaction relies and depends 
on intricate and open flows of people, goods, commodities, information, and capital 
(Coaffee, 2009).  Graham (2007) worries that current government policies towards urban 
anti-terrorism could potentially reduce the cities “porous, open, intrinsically 
unpredictable city spaces and systems” to nothing more than an endless series of secured 
passage points.  For city dwellers, urban anonymity would be lost and urban life would 
be intolerable and unsustainable.  As Graham (2007) states:  
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With the pervasive mantra of security creeping over every 
domain of public life and public policy – which previously 
were dominated by other concerns such as urban design, 
social, welfare, immigration policy, transportation 
management, and city planning – there is a real risk that 
with the excuse of stopping terrorists before they strike, the 
very processes of interchange, interconnection, privacy, 
political mobilization, and social and democratic 
innovation that make cities livable, dynamic, creative and 
successful, might be seriously undermined (¶ 15).  
 
Statement of Purpose 
It is not a matter of if another terrorist attack will occur, but when.  These attacks 
can occur in any major city or small town U.S.A.  What is known, is the fundamental 
counter measure to prevent such attacks is urban fortification; and the fortification itself 
does have a measurable influence on urban public space (Coaffee, 2009; Graham, 2010; 
Hollander and Whitfield, 2005; Marcuse, 2006; Savitch, 2008; and Warren, 2002).  The 
measurable influence on urban public space is a combination of 
militarization/fortification/deployment of security zones, the decline of iconography, and 
decentralization (Briggs, 2005).   
Few researchers have examined what security methods are present within the 
urban areas.  While studies have described the existence of anti-terror security that is 
present in global cities like New York (Marcuse, 2006), London (Coaffee, 2009), 
Washington D.C. (Benton-Short, 2007) and Jerusalem (Savitch, 2008), none have 
conducted empirical assessments of the spatial extent of security zones.  Studies that have 
identified the existence of security zones (Hollander and Whitfield, 2010) have only 
provided recommendations for a balance between open public spaces and their security.  
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However, these studies did not provide approximations or the degree and intensity of 
security zones.   
Given the amount of research dedicated to the aesthetics and perception in urban 
security studies, the lack of studies on security zones in urban public space is an 
oversight.  The majority of urban security research has been focused on the symbolic 
meaning of the security measures (Blobaum and Hunecke, 2005; Day 2006; Wang and 
Taylor, 2006).  This dissertation contributes to empirical studies on the spatial extent and 
intensity of urban fortification/security zones and their influence on urban public space.   
This study determines where security zones manifest themselves by quantifying 
the fortification of the security zones and measure the intensity of these spaces in three 
major U.S. cities.  Once the intensity and extent of the security zones have been 
identified, this dissertation will show how the increased security affects demographic, 
economic, and social activity within the central business districts of Chicago, 
Indianapolis, and Detroit.  By studying cities such as Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit, 
this analysis will determine whether cities that have not experienced a major terrorist 
attack and have a smaller population and density, have fortified buildings, areas, and 
neighborhoods and also restrict or close off public space in their civic and financial 
districts, similar to larger global cities such as New York, London, and Madrid.     
The fortification of urban space dissolves many settings in which protests, 
demonstrations, and various other First Amendment rights can be freely utilized.  Urban 
public space has been based on creating open and safe environments for city dwellers.  
However, ultra-secure urban spaces can filter citizens into oppositional groups limiting 
access to those believed appropriate (Nemeth, 2009).  Newman (1973) found that 
9 
 
 
constant surveillance in a public space made pedestrians feel as if they were hostile 
foreigners who should not be present.  Security zones may function well in securing 
property and the safety of urban dwellers, but if social and commercial activities are 
being affected by security zones, empirical studies are needed to better understand the 
frequency and intensity of security zones manifesting themselves within public space.          
Methodology 
To better understand the emerging phenomena of security zones and fortifying 
urban public space, this dissertation will examine security zones located in the civic and 
financial business districts in three U.S. cities: Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis.  Major 
global cities such as London and New York, having all experienced terrorist attacks, are 
recognized as the standard of interagency collaboration and proactive planning against 
terrorist attacks (Ervin, 2008).  However, there is virtually nothing written about recent 
security measures or changing urban space in Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis in 
response to security zones.       
 Each city in this study is listed in the Department of Homeland Security’s 2010 
Urban Area Security Initiative List.  The United States Department of Homeland Security 
has identified these cities as high risk targets for future terrorist strikes, and these cities 
receive federal funding in response to this threat.  The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) devotes 34 percent of its operating budget to making potential terrorist targets less 
vulnerable to attack (Hobijn and Sager, 2007).  The DHS considers Chicago to be a Tier I 
urban area due to its high population density and high risk for threats (DHS, 2010).  An 
analysis of this type of city is likely to expose fortification measures at their most 
extreme.   Detroit and Indianapolis are considered Tier II cities due to their lack of 
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potential terrorist targets.  These cities were selected in order to determine the level and 
intensity of security differences between Tier I and II type cities, as well as to compare 
the differences in social and commercial activities between Tier I and Tier II cities.   
 It is also informative to analyze central businesses districts in cities other than 
New York, London, and other major global cities, to better understand whether security 
measures differ in relation to the size and population density of cities.  Therefore, this 
dissertation will examine security zones/fortified spaces within both civic center districts, 
which are comprised mainly of public buildings and governmental structures, and 
financial business districts which encompass major banks and other financial institutions.  
For the three sample cities, these areas are located within their central business districts.  
The concentration of high-profile corporate headquarters and governmental buildings 
make these areas prime targets for high profile terrorist attacks (Savitch, 2008).   
 The districts studied within each city differ in population, density, size, and 
geographic location.  Each city offers a very different expression of public space.  This 
study considers public space to be: publicly or privately owned exterior space legally 
required to allow public access, including all plazas, parks, sidewalks, and pedestrian 
streets where motorized traffic is forbidden.  Privately owned spaces, such as corporate 
plazas, are still publicly accessible, but might present different obstacles or prioritize use 
for employees over the general public. 
A security zone is a restricted area located around a public or private building that 
has a combination of access restrictions, behavioral controls, or other security measures 
(Nemeth and Hollander, 2010).  These individual zones embody a security landscape and 
can be located on either public or private property and enforced and managed by private 
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developers and property managers or governmental entities.  An individual entering a 
security zone will either be surveilled, have their behavior modified, or have their access 
restricted to some degree, or experience a combination of these measures, while 
occupying security zone space.  The main attribute of a security zone is that it originates 
as an aftereffect of terrorism prevention (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005).   
Because the levels of security zone restrictions vary from zone to zone, a simple 
and objective set of criteria is used to distinguish and classify security zones and security 
landscapes based on their overall level of restriction and or the presence and intensity of 
certain benchmarks. 
 
Figure 1: Jersey Barriers 
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Figure 2: Bollards surrounding the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
These benchmark variables will be access restrictions, behavioral controls, and 
surveillance.  Access restrictions will include: bollards, Jersey barriers, gates, or fences 
located at entrance and exit points to a space or building.  Behavioral controls include 
posted signs prohibiting activities such as photography or loitering, or physical features 
that discourage sitting or gathering in small or large groups.  Surveillance measures will 
include security guards/police officers and other human surveillance.  Closed circuit 
television (CCTV) video surveillance cameras are also included under surveillance.   
 Drawing from Robert Sampson’s ecometric method of observing behavioral 
settings, Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit were visited over a period of several days to 
collect cross-sectional systematic social observations of existing security zones.  Each 
city’s security zone variables were observed then coded for analysis.  The dimensions of 
each security zone were also geotagged to ascertain and document the intensity of each 
individual security zone.  While in the field, a global positioning system (GPS) digital 
camera was employed to define the boundaries of the security zones.  Identifiable 
security zones were photographed with the GPS camera which embeds global positional 
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data, latitude and longitude, into the digital picture.  This process is called geotagging 
photos.  The geotagged photographs were then uploaded into the geographic information 
system (GIS) computing software program ArcGIS.  The geotagged photos, with the 
global positioning data, were then encoded to ArcGIS.  The geotagged photographs allow 
for the creation of security zone polygons by using the spatial calculation of the total area 
of each security zone polygon. High resolution photographs of each security zone were 
also collected.  Buildings exhibiting the security zone classification criteria were 
observed and coded for spatial analysis in ArcGIS.   
Once the security zones were identified within the ArcGIS program a spatial 
analysis of the data was conducted.  The spatial analysis tool of inverse distance weighted 
(IDW) interpolation, contained within the ArcGIS program, measured for the intensity of 
the security zones and its neighboring space.  IDW interpolation predicts a value for any 
unmeasured data point using values from measured data points.  This method is used to 
measure the values of a particular phenomenon that cannot be measured at every data 
point.  Interpolation is commonly used for measuring precipitation, temperature, soil and 
ground water characteristics, pollution sources, and various vegetation data.   
This dissertation is the first time IDW interpolation will be employed to measure 
the social phenomena of security zones.  IDW interpolation will provide an observable 
frequency and intensity of a security surface for security zones/defensible space measures 
deployed to protect high value terrorist targets within each city’s core.  ArcScene, a 3D 
visualization software program that allows for GIS data to be viewed in three dimensions, 
will be used to provide highly detailed security zone surfaces of the IDW interpolation 
maps.  This methodology can be replicated and will allow for future researchers to 
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engage in cross-sectional or longitudinal analysis of Chicago, Indianapolis, Detroit or 
other cities.   
As previously stated, this dissertation will compare demographic, economic, and 
social activity in the three cities, both within the identified security zones and areas 
outside of the identified security zones.  The data used for this study will be population 
rates, crime rates, and office space rental rates from 2000 through 2010.  In doing so, this 
dissertation will provide a visual representation of security zones in these cities, as well 
as offer an explanation of its influences over commercial and social activities within 
these security zones. 
 Chapter two provides a theoretical foundation for this dissertation.  Chapter three 
begins with a review of the scholarly literature on the history on fortifying public and 
private space within cities.  The chapter explains the application and evolution of 
combating terrorist activities with crime prevention through environmental design.  A 
detailed description of how security zones, located in the civic and financial business 
districts in three U.S. cities: Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis, will be analyzed and the 
methodology that will be used to provide such analysis will be discussed in chapter four.  
The findings and discussion are located in chapter five.  Chapter six contains the 
conclusion and recommendations section, which provides suggestions for future studies.   
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Social Disorganization Theory  
 Although the concept of community is fundamental to society in general, 
sociological definitions of community began with Par and Burges and the Chicago 
School of Urban Sociology.  Park and Burgess (1924) defined community as an area 
developing from the competition over property, real estate, and other resources in an 
urbanized city.  Since this definition, a neighborhood has been considered as a 
geographical and social subset of a community in which residents share a common sense 
of identity that continues over a period of time (Burskik and Grasmick, 1993).  Because 
of this, empirical studies have approximated neighborhoods by geographical and political 
boundaries such as census tracts, block groups, and various physical features.   
 Based upon Park and Burgess’ (1924) theory of urban ecology, Shaw and McKay 
(1942) conducted a study of the spatial distribution of juvenile delinquency in Chicago 
during the 1920s, which led them to propose social disorganization theory.  Their study 
provided an explanation for the unequal distribution of criminal activity in urban spaces.  
They found by mapping out residential locations of juvenile delinquency over time that 
crime rates are highest in lower-class neighborhoods, with a concentration within the 
urban core.  The crime rates decreased the further a juvenile was from the city center.  
Shaw and McKay also found that crime rates in areas of the city remain stable over time, 
regardless of social makeup.  Therefore, juvenile delinquency was profoundly 
concentrated in inner city neighborhoods over time, despite an almost total change in the 
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racial and ethnic makeup of residents.  This suggested that the setting was in some way 
responsible for the crime rates.   
Shaw and McKay (1942) also found that neighborhoods in the inner city were 
characterized by numerous social problems.  The inner city neighborhoods were 
economically disadvantaged as indicated by the high number of people receiving public 
assistance.  Also, a high proportion of the people had low median rent, a low rate of 
housing ownership, and high unemployment rates.  Housing conditions were poor and the 
jobs available to residents were mainly low skilled industrial jobs.  Shaw and McKay also 
found the high crime neighborhoods were characterized by high residential turnover 
rates.  They found several health problems within these neighborhoods such as infant 
mortality, tuberculosis, and mental disorder.  Finally, high crime neighborhoods were 
characterized by racial diversity.  Shaw and McKay believed the mixture of ethnic groups 
hindered the collective efficacy among neighborhood residents.  With these findings, 
Shaw and McKay argued the spatial distribution of juvenile delinquency was a function 
of ecological characteristics, and not the individual characteristics of neighborhood 
residents.  Their model suggested that neighborhood structural characteristics, such as 
poverty and residential mobility, led to the social disorganization of the neighborhood, 
which resulted in an increase in crime rates.         
Shaw and McKay’s empirical analysis and theoretical outline were paramount in 
supporting future studies of crime; however, several limitations of their work have been 
identified (Bursik, 1988; Kurban and Weitzer, 2003; Sampson and Groves, 1989).  The 
most glaring problem with Shaw and McKay’s theory is it did not explain the causal 
mechanism that links neighborhood social disorganization to high crime rates.  Most 
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notably, two versions of social disorganization theory can be perceived from Shaw and 
McKay’s model (Kornhauser, 1978).  The first is a variation of social disorganization 
theory that links structural characteristics and crime through the frustrated wants of 
residents in disadvantaged communities.  Frustrated wants are the outcome of disparities 
between aspirations and expectations.  The strain variation of social disorganization 
theory hypothesizes that criminal motivation and frustrated wants, resulting from the 
structural characteristics of the neighborhood, is the intervening variable leading to an 
increase in the crime rate.   
 The second version of social disorganization theory links structural characteristics 
and crime through weakened informal social controls.  Informal social control in socially 
disorganized neighborhoods can be diminished in several ways.  Due to high residential 
mobility and racial diversity, inhabitants of disorganized neighborhoods do not create or 
maintain an agreement of norms and values.  A sense of attachment to the community, 
social solidarity, and social cohesion are all diminished.  Residents who plan to leave 
their communities as soon as they have the means have little or no interest in fixing 
neighborhood issues.  With no common goals, neighborhood residents cannot implement 
social controls and crime rates increase.  Vacant buildings, graffiti, broken windows, and 
vagrants become symbols that the neighborhood is in disarray.   
 Shaw and McKay (1942) also observed that inhabitants of disorganized 
neighborhoods have fewer incentives in conformity, which lowers social controls or 
deterrents against criminal activity.  Juveniles living in disorganized neighborhoods 
cannot develop conformity due to a conflicting value system.  Having been exposed to 
delinquent subcultures, the juveniles start to have low internal control and cultivate 
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beliefs that are not consistent with conventional norms and values.  Additionally, 
traditional social institutions, such as family and schools, began to deteriorate which only 
contributes to the lack of conformity and decreased social controls.  
 The control model of social disorganization theory contends that social control, 
which is shaped internally and externally, impacts the costs of criminal activity.  
Neighborhoods with high levels of social control make it difficult for individuals to 
commit crime.  Likewise, a neighborhood with decreased informal social controls, have 
diminished stakes in conformity and weakens deterrents for criminal acts.  Kornhauser 
(1978) compared both versions of social disorganization theory and argues that the 
control version is consistent with empirical evidence rather than the strain version.     
 Researchers have expanded upon the control version of social disorganization 
theory by using survey data to identify the role of social ties and networks among 
neighborhood inhabitants in establishing informal social control measures (Bursik and 
Grasmik, 1993; Lowenkamp, Cullen, and Pratt, 2003; Sampson, 1991; Sampson and 
Groves, 1989).  In particular, Sampson and Groves (1989) presented that the effects of 
structural characteristics on the level of crime were facilitated by the degree of 
participation in community activities and extent of friendship networks, and the presence 
of unsupervised youths.  They argued that the structural characteristics of a 
neighborhood, such as poverty, mobility, and racial composition, can decrease social ties 
among residents, lower participation in community establishments, and the informal 
monitoring of juveniles, which results in an increase in the level of criminal activity. 
 Bursik and Grasmick (1993) argued that social control in neighborhoods is 
founded by social and physical institutions like family, schools, churches, and political 
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groups.  More specifically, they reasoned the level of social organization and control 
varies across neighborhoods.  This largely depends on the scope of internal social 
cohesion among residents, as well as the extent of community leaders ties to outside 
resources.  Bursik and Grasmick’s version of social disorganization theory is referred to 
as a systemic model that stresses the importance of networks among community 
members.  Their model suggests that structural characteristics, such as socioeconomic 
status, diversity, and instability, affect the creation of these networks, which affects 
various types of social controls.     
 However, Sampson (2004) disagreed with Bursik and Grasmick’s version and 
claimed that strong social networks do not automatically result in effective social 
controls.  Sampson argues that collective efficacy, the mutual trust among residents and 
the willingness to intervene when problems are present, is the key structural characteristic 
that links social ties and the level of social control (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 
2001; Sampson, 2004; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997).  Using a multilevel 
framework, Sampson and his associates show that collective efficacy can be reliably 
measured at the neighborhood level.  Using 1990 census data with a survey of Chicago 
residents, Sampson and his team found that the spatial proximity to homicide is strongly 
related to increased homicide rates.  Collective efficacy with concentrated disadvantage, 
immigrant concentration, and community instability was able to explain approximately 
70 percent of the variability in neighborhood violence.  They also found that collective 
efficacy was able to mediate a substantial amount of neighborhood violence through the 
levels of socioeconomic disadvantage and residential instability.              
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 Social disorganization theory offers a theoretical framework to understand the 
relations between neighborhood structural characteristics and criminal activity.  The 
strain version of the theory argues that the principle variable that links neighborhood 
characteristics and crime is produced by neighborhood disadvantage which increases 
criminal motivation.  The distribution of crime over space is a result of the degree in the 
distribution of motivated offenders.  However, the control version of the social 
disorganization theory links the structural characteristics of neighborhoods to the level of 
crime through informal social control measures.  Social networks amongst residents, 
interests in community issues, and a shared value system strengthen informal social 
control.  The control version of the theory explains the spatial distribution of crime by 
fluctuating levels of social control that neighborhoods employ.               
Routine Activities 
 In addition to social disorganization theory, routine activities theory has been 
utilized to explain criminal activity over space, particularly at the micro level.  Routine 
activities theory views criminal events as the meeting of offenders and victims happening 
under a certain set of circumstances.  Routine activities theory holds that a crime occurs 
when a motivated offender and a suitable target converge in time and space in the 
absence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979).  The theory states that the 
amount of crime can change even without an increase or decrease in the amount of 
motivated offenders.  Instead the number of crimes can increase or decrease as the 
availability of suitable targets increases or decreases.  Decreasing the amount of capable 
guardians increases criminal opportunity, which leads to an increase in criminal activity.   
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 It must be noted that routine activities theory does not explain the factors of 
criminal motivation.  The theory treats criminal motivation as a truth and instead focuses 
on the contexts and situations in which crime is most likely to happen.  When explaining 
criminal events, routine activities theory assumes that individuals have rational choices.  
Criminal behavior is then predicted on the costs and benefits involved in the commission 
of a criminal act.  The costs and benefits vary depending on the situations and targets.  
Routine activities theory considers opportunity a necessary component for a crime to 
occur.  The theory holds that crimes are not randomly distributed over space and time 
because opportunity in not consistently distributed over space and time.      
 Under this theoretical framework, places and social contexts can facilitate or 
reduce crime in several ways.  The first, is that physical features of a space can affect the 
degree of social control and criminal opportunities (Clarke, 2002; McNulty and 
Holloway, 2000; Sampson, 2002).  High rise buildings can reduce natural surveillance 
because residents are living vertically and are uninvolved from monitoring activities at 
the street level.  Secondly, Residents may also not know each other because of high 
residential turnover, which offers anonymity for potential offenders.  Regardless of 
physical features, the crime rates are also affected by routine activities that are present 
(Block and Block, 1995; Davis, 1987; Eck 1995; Roncek and Maier, 1991).  In particular, 
vacant buildings and rundown housing units may provide a potential market for drug 
dealers without fear of complaints from residents.   
 In addition to a micro level explanation for criminal activity, routine activities 
theory also provides a framework for understanding crime at the macro level.   Cohen and 
Felson (1979) originally applied their theory to explain crime rates at the collective level.  
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Their departure from the aggregate level was a contradiction between improving social 
conditions and the increasing crime rates in the 1960s (Eck, 1995).  During that time, 
socioeconomic conditions of citizens were improving, such as median household income, 
education levels, and drops in unemployment.  However, crime rates were increasing.  
Cohen and Felson (1979) believed that the increase in crime rates could be attributed to 
changes in the routine activity patterns of U.S. citizens.  An increase in non-household 
activities caused by the increase in labor force participation left many houses unguarded.  
These activities have shifted from private to public.  Also, the availability of household 
televisions and stereos increased the number of suitable targets for crime.  Cohen and 
Felson (1974) measured crime data from 1947 through 1974, and found that increased 
non-household activities were significantly associated with increased crime rates.  
 Routine activities theory effectively argues that the routine activities of both 
legitimate citizens and motivated offenders lead to the variation in criminal opportunities.  
Spaces and neighborhoods become crime hotspots because large amounts of individuals 
are attracted for reasons unrelated to criminal motivations, such as malls and airports.  
The hotspots also attracted motivated offenders due to the suitable opportunity for a 
criminal act.  Also, an increase in the level of crime can occur if the level of guardianship 
fluctuates.  By framing criminal acts as the time and spatial intersection of motivated 
offenders and unguarded targets, routine activities theory provides an improved 
understanding for time and spatial structures of crime events.                
Explanation of Behavior Settings 
 Both social disorganization and routine activities theory stress an importance of 
the surrounding space; which has an influence over criminal activity.  However, a better 
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understanding of space, more specifically behavior settings, is needed to describe the 
influences of criminal activity.  Barker (1968) was the first researcher to originate the 
idea of a behavior setting.  Behavior settings have since been defined as “naturally 
occurring units with standing patterns of behavior and a physical milieu that surrounds or 
encloses the behavior” (Moss, 1976, pp. 215).  These settings are located in time and 
space.  Behavior settings can include communities, neighborhoods, street corners, 
buildings, lobbies, and classrooms.  Schoggen (1989) stresses a behavior setting is not a 
characteristic of the individual(s) involved, instead it is an “extra-individual” behavior 
phenomenon; meaning the behavior setting has unique and stable characteristics that 
persist even when people occupying the setting are removed and replaced with new 
individuals.   
 Behavior settings are the environment that is external to the individual and may 
influence, by enabling or constraining, his or her actions, including criminal behavior 
(Block and Block, 1995).  Individuals’ environments can be thought of as an arrangement 
of behavior settings that they are exposed to during their day to day encounters.  
Individuals’ encounters with behavior settings create perceptions of options and 
prospects, called situations, in which the person may express their tendencies by making 
judgments and choices resulting in actions (Wikstrom, 1998).   
With this in mind, it is important to note, that some behavior settings may be 
more likely than others to create situations in which a person may act unlawfully.  The 
above mentioned assumption aligns with the fact that crimes are not randomly 
distributed, and the occurrence of a particular type of crime is usually linked to a 
particular type of legal activity; for example, violence occurring between strangers 
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usually happens during public activities (Wikstrom, 1991). Block and Block (1995) 
conducted a study on the relationship between the locations and density of bars, taverns, 
and liquor stores and the criminal behavior in the surrounding neighborhoods.  They used 
a “GeoArchive” data set of police, census, and liquor license information from January to 
June in 1993.  The data was compared to locations, crime events occurring within those 
areas, and incidents occurring in the adjacent areas.  To their surprise, they found the 
location and density of bars, taverns, and liquor stores were not a strong indicator of 
criminal activity within the neighborhood areas.  
The question then becomes, what makes a behavior setting more criminogenic 
than another one?  Wikstrom (1998) states this can be explained by the extent to which 
the setting produces three characteristics.  The first are temptations, which are perceived 
options for particular desires.  The second is provocations; these are perceived attacks on 
an individual’s property, security, or respect that evokes anger or similar emotions that 
could incite unlawful aggressive responses.  The final trait is weak deterrence, which are 
the perceived low risks of consequences or detection generally associated with engaging 
in unlawful activity in response to provocations or temptations.   
Wikstrom and Sampson (2003) state, given the cultural and structural 
environment, some types of behavior settings inherently produce higher levels of 
temptation, provocation, and deterrence than others.   However, the degree at which a 
person will be tempted and provoked by a situation and the likelihood they will engage in 
unlawful activity is dependent on their self-control and morality.  It is also plausible that 
the deterrent effect of a particular behavior setting is also dependent on the individual’s 
disposition to engage in criminal activity (Wikstrom, 1998).   The deterrent measures of a 
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behavior setting may not play a huge factor for a person’s course of action if they have 
low self-control and have little regard for the consequences of their criminal behavior 
(Wikstrom, 1995).  If the notion that behavior settings differ in their possible 
criminogenic characteristics, then a key question that must be answered is why some 
behavior settings tend to be potentially more criminogenic than others.  According to 
Wikstrom (1998), this can be answered by examining the role community context has in 
producing behavior settings with more or less criminogenic characteristics.      
Structural Characteristics within the Behavior Setting 
Neighborhoods and communities vary widely in their structural characteristics 
(Wikstrom and Sampson, 2003).  These variations can include residential population 
characteristics and compositions such as poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, family factors, 
and stability of residents.  However, structural characteristics also include the differences 
in the characteristics and layout of buildings and spaces and their related activities 
(Michelson, 1976).  These include density and arrangement of the space and the presence 
of buildings and spaces for non-residential use.  Structural characteristics of 
neighborhoods can also include the makeup and composition of the nonresidential 
population of people occupying the area.  That is individuals who work, but may not live 
in the area, people who visit people who live within the area, or people who are attending 
activities within the area.  Variations in community structural characteristics are, 
“fundamentally a result of processes of residential segregation and differential land use 
which, in turn, are related to aspects of wider political economy, such as means of 
production (technology), division of labor, and distribution of wealth (inequality)” 
(Sampson, 1999, pp. 261). 
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Wikstrom and Sampson (2003) argue that the social mechanisms, enabled by 
structural characteristics through their impact on the community social environment, 
influences individual development and actions.  Wikstrom (1998) summarizes this as 
resources, rules, and routines.  Wikstrom’s basic premise is that the community structure 
provides the rules and resources that residents take cues from in their daily lives, which in 
turn influences the “patterning and content” of their daily routines, and the specific 
resources and rules linked with types of behavior settings created by the community 
routines.  Wikstrom (2002) points out that even the most heinous criminal offenders only 
spend a fraction of their time committing criminal acts, which highlight that behavior 
settings may be an important factor in triggering criminal actions.  Wikstrom and 
Sampson (2003) state the role of community context for individual action is that it either 
restricts or facilitates and guides a person’s action through the behavior settings created 
by the community routines and the type of resources and rules associated to a particular 
behavior setting. 
The importance of community resources, rules, and routines for the explanation of 
a person’s involvement in criminal activity has been established in community centered 
criminological research; however, a key concept remains underdeveloped.  What is 
lacking is the concept that directly connects the community context to individual 
development and actions (Wikstrom, 1998).  Sampson and Wikstrom (2003) believe the 
behavior setting is the factor that could provide such a link.  Dishion, French, and 
Patterson (1995) are among the few researchers that have stressed the importance of 
behavior settings for the explanation of antisocial behavior.  While observing deviant 
behaviors in juveniles in both the home and school setting, they were able to link 
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neighborhood context to early onset antisocial behavior.  However, their explanation of 
behavior settings is unrestrained and lumps a wide range of behavior settings which 
includes neighborhoods to school classrooms.  Shonkoff and Phillips (2000), who also 
look at adolescent antisocial behavior, found that while family supervision of the child is 
a community factor, the community context in which the families operate, are likely to 
influence management strategies of the child.  Based on this work, Wikstrom and 
Sampson (2003) argue a person’s encounter with behavior settings, depending on the 
individual’s characteristics and the characteristics of the behavior setting, will perceive 
their options then make choices, and take action.     
Researchers have traditionally studied the impact of collective efficacy on 
behavior settings to better explain social disorganization.  Sampson (2003) has 
established that social mechanisms operating within behavior settings can either restrict 
or facilitates people’s actions.  Such mechanisms can be the deciding factor between a 
behavior setting having high or low levels of temptation, provocation, and deterrence.  
Using this theoretical framework, this dissertation will draw upon the social 
disorganization and routine activities theories and examine a new form of social 
mechanisms that are being systematically implemented within urban settings across the 
United States.   
In the post 9/11 era, cities have undergone urban fortification at an unprecedented 
level.  While studies have described the existence of anti-terrorism security areas that are 
present in global cities like New York (Marcuse, 2006), London (Coaffee, 2009), 
Washington D.C. (Benton-Short, 2007) and Jerusalem (Savitch, 2008), none have 
conducted empirical assessments on the spatial extent of security zones and their effect 
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on the behavior settings in which they exist.  Studies have identified the existence of 
security zones (Hollander and Whitfield, 2010; Nemeth, 2010; Nemeth and Hollander, 
2010), but have only provided recommendations for a balance between open public 
spaces and their security.  Even fewer studies provide approximations of the degree and 
intensity of security zones.   
Conclusion 
 Most research on neighborhoods and community areas have relied upon 
administrative data collected by government agencies such as the Bureau of the Census.  
Census data primarily covers socio-demographic characteristics such as race, poverty, 
unemployment, and family structure.  Other neighborhood level administrative data 
includes crime reports, public health data, education, and various social service figures.  
Although administrative data provides insight into neighborhood activities, they are not 
useful for displaying unofficial activities.  Common sources of data are ill equipped to 
explain the physical property of neighborhoods such as undetected crimes, density of 
business types, and security zones.    
 Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) describe the study of the reliability and validity 
of assessing ecological units, at the neighborhood level, as ecometrics.  Ecometrics is 
used to measure neighborhood context/social processes primarily through direct 
observation that would not normally be cataloged by the aforementioned administrative 
data collection agencies (Savitiz and Raudenbush, 2009).  For example, Raudenbush and 
Sampson (1999) studied physical and social disorder within Chicago neighborhoods by 
using such observational measures.  They observed and coded city blocks for the 
presence or absence of abandoned cars, graffiti, syringes, broken bottles, and other 
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various forms of neighborhood garbage.  Raudenbush and Sampson utilized this 
observational data to produce a measure of physical disorder within the sampled 
neighborhood.   
 In his 2012 presidential address to the American Society of Criminology, Robert 
Sampson called upon researchers to utilize advances in technology to identify and 
measure social phenomena across varying spatial scales.  In particular, Sampson (2013) 
mentioned how advances in GPS and GIS technology should be and can be adapted to 
help transform how contextual research is conducted.  Much like the Boston Area 
Research Initiative, which provides a vast array of visual socioeconomic information 
through a GIS system, ecometric research should make use of these technological 
advances to better visualize and provide a more accurate neighborhood context 
(Sampson, 2013).    
Employing similar ecometric methods and answering Sampson’s call for GPS and 
GIS integration into social research, this dissertation relies upon the direct observation of 
anti-terrorism security measures occurring within the central business districts of three 
U.S. cities.  By using anti-terrorism security variables, such as access restrictions, 
surveillance, and behavioral controls, this study will determine where these security 
zones manifest themselves and measures the degree of intensity of these spaces through a 
geographic information system to produce an inverse distance weighted interpolation 
map.  Once the intensity and extent of the security zones have been identified, this 
dissertation will then compare demographic, economic, and social activity within the 
identified security zones to areas outside of the identified security zones. 
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This dissertation will also expand upon Sampson’s definition of social 
mechanisms to include anti-terrorism security zones appearing in urban areas.  And 
although security zones were present prior to 2000, the drastic expansion of security 
zones did not occur until after the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks.  Security zones are 
essentially social mechanisms that have a purpose of regulating, reducing, and or 
displacing political crime within behavior settings.  The question this dissertation asks is: 
are the security zones affecting demographic, economic, and social activities within the 
identified security zones of Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit. 
It is reasonable to expect that security zones within these three U.S. cities are 
reducing and or displacing crime rates within these areas, and therefore creating a safer 
space for people to live and work.  Therefore, over time, economic activity should 
increase within the security zones.  Additionally, with lower crime rates and increased 
economic activities, it could be argued that there should also be an increase in population.  
The following chapter provides a detailed explanation of urban fortification and security 
zone literature. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FORTIFYING URBAN LANDSCAPES 
Introduction 
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the privatization and fortification of 
public space within cities has progressed at an unprecedented rate, especially for New 
York City, London, Madrid, Mumbai, and other global cities that have a perceived threat 
of future attacks (Davis, 2001; Light, 2002; Graham, 2004; Sternburg and Lee, 2006).  It 
should be noted that the September 11
th
 attacks did not mark a beginning of fortifying 
urban areas; however, the events after 9/11 can be seen as an example emphasizing the 
ongoing historical trend of increased urban security (Coaffee, O’Hare; Hawkesworth, 
2009).     
 From the beginning of civilization, cities have been designed to defend against 
invading armies or protect its inhabitants from the elements (Forbes, 1965).  As 
urbanization took place, the defensive mechanisms deployed by city authorities became 
more advanced in repelling intruders (Morris, 1994).  The most common form of these 
defense mechanisms was physical barriers such as gates, walls and ditches (Mumford, 
1961).  These structures, especially the city wall, produced an image of inclusion and 
exclusion.  The rich would live within the well defended city and the poor would live in 
danger outside of the city’s defenses (Pile, Brook and Mooney, 1999).  Archaeologists 
have found ancient urban areas near the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates and Yangtze Rivers that 
were often surrounded by ditches, walls and other defensive measures to protect 
themselves from outside dangers (Morris, 1994).   
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The features of a city wall, tower, and ditch has become the most conjured image 
of an ancient city.  These defensive features have changed very little since the creation of 
Jericho until the use of gunpowder hundreds of years later (Keegan, 1993).  Once cities 
became more open, new defensive features began to take hold.  New walls and gated 
spaces started to develop within the city (Luymes, 1997).  By the mid-nineteenth century 
many cities featured secured residential housing for the social elite (Newman, 1980).  
Finding the appropriate defense from external attacks has been an ongoing conundrum 
for many urban planners (Morris, 1994).   
 According to Coaffee et al. (2009) cities have been characterized with feelings of 
insecurity and fear of crime.  As cities evolved, defensive measures became more 
complex in order to cope with the ever changing strategies of invaders.  Poyner (1983) 
noted that castles and walled villages of Medieval Europe were prime examples of this 
blueprint.  Internal defenses were represented by the fortress or keep, usually surrounded 
by a moat, centered in the middle of the village, while external defenses, such as a city 
wall, were the first line of defense.  As technology improved, the city wall and castle 
became less relevant.            
 In many ways, modern cities are no different from their medieval counterparts.  
Modern cities embed defensive features into their urban landscape.  During the 1960s, the 
association of urban design and defensive architecture was given widespread 
consideration due to rising crime rates and the decay of high-rise residential buildings 
(Newman, 1995; Gold, 2007).  The most notable are the concepts of Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design and Defensible Space.  These theories advocate for 
controlling and/or deterring crime by “designing out” the crime through the addition or 
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removal of certain physical features.  These features can control access, increase 
surveillance, and therefore limit the opportunity for crime to occur in these spaces.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, law enforcement officials in the United Kingdom and Israel 
also employed these strategies in response to terrorist attacks (Brown, 1985; Coaffee, 
2009).   
 The 1990s saw a further increase in violent crime along with various racial 
conflicts which furthered segregation within the urban landscape (McLaughlin; Muncie, 
1999).  This was also fueled by numerous fortification and surveillance features popping 
up within cities during the 1990s.  Common urban fortifications can include everything 
from gated communities, walls, doors, and bollards to Jersey barriers, surveillance 
cameras, narrowed or obscured entrances, and manned security booths.  Commercial 
plazas, neighborhoods, retail stores, entertainment districts, and public facilities were 
fortified due to the policy actions of urban authorities, business owners, and wealthy 
citizens (Fyfe, 1997; Davis, 1998).  Mike Davis (1995) argued cities were becoming 
alarmingly fortified and have become places of terror rather than public spaces.  Davis 
believed the city was becoming militarized and was transforming into a place that policed 
social boundaries through architecture (Davis, 1995).   
 Perceptions of fear among city residents helped increase the trend towards urban 
fortification (Glassner, 2000; Furedi, 2002).  Citizens living in city areas perceived to be 
at risk of criminal activity construct defensive regions to protect themselves (Ellin, 1997).  
These urban fortifications are costly, which divides the rich from the poor.  Many 
researchers have argued that present day life in the city has changed and that certain 
members of society have sealed themselves away from the rest of the city.  This sealing 
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away creates a new type of privatized space which does not allow the same level of 
access to all members of society (Sorkin, 1992; Atkinson and Helms, 2007).   
 In the past several decades the urban landscape has been repurposed and 
restructured due to political processes at the local and global levels that continue to 
separate cities into individual territories, cultures, and economies (Graham and Marvin 
2001; Coaffee and Murakami-Wood, 2006).  The idea of segregating and restructuring 
sections of the city in the attempt to group certain areas for socioeconomic advantages is 
nothing new (Graham, 2004; Coaffee, Murakami-Wood and Rogers, 2008).  These 
groupings have formed financial, civic and cultural districts or enclaves within the city.  
This grouping phenomenon has increased in recent years due to the increased fear of 
crime and terrorism in urban areas as well as recent economic struggles between cities 
(Savitch; Coaffee and Rogers 2008). 
 The fortification and privatization of public space is the common response when 
city dwellers are fearful of criminal acts (Ellin, 1997).  As a result of an increased 
perception of crime, or potential act of terrorism experienced by inhabitants of a 
particular area, fortification and privatization occurs, which leads to the modifying or 
repurposing of the physical form in an urban landscape (Graham, 2002; Coaffee 2005; 
2006).  This perception has led to a number of fortified urban features in many U.S. 
cities.  These features can range from the removal of city benches to curtail the homeless 
living on the street, to the extreme of gated and guarded commercial and residential areas 
(Davis, 1990; Flusty 1994).   
 Although it may not be as obvious, contemporary cities have their own emphasis 
on defense.  During the last several decades, many defensive measures have been 
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employed to respond to rising crime rates and the fear of crime, escalating social 
conflicts, increased racial and ethnic tensions, and the increase of attacks by terrorist 
groups against urban infrastructure.  These risks have led to urban authorities deploying 
sophisticated surveillance, advanced security management plans, and urban fortification 
measures.  These fortification measures have commonly been described as the fortress 
city, walled city, and gated communities.  These security features reduce public access, 
enhance surveillance and have a number of security personnel patrolling these areas.  
These measures invoke notions of unfair spatial control of a certain urban area by certain 
social groups (Coaffee et al., 2009).   
Public Space  
 Public space is essential for the livelihood of cities.  Public spaces are sites of 
interaction in which individuals cooperate with one another.  Cities are full of freely 
accessible spaces allowing for planned or unplanned encounters and activities.  Public 
spaces can be seen as educating city inhabitants about one another (Lofland, 2000).  In 
order to be successful, public spaces must be unconditionally accessible and inclusive, 
while encouraging interaction between acquaintances and strangers (Kohn, 2004).  Public 
spaces serve as a location where social interactions and public activities can occur for all 
members of the public (Mitchell, 2003).   
 This concept of public space has been long accepted by many urban theorists.  
Wirth (1938) argued that the city is an urban stage and a protector of freedom and 
tolerance.  Jacobs (1961) believed that urban planners could increase sociability by 
prioritizing street level action within neighborhoods like Greenwich Village, New York 
during the mid-twentieth century.  Rapoport (1977) contends that cities must 
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accommodate a diversity of uses and users by remaining adaptable and flexible.  In 1974, 
Henri Lefebvre published The Production of Space.  Lefebvre’s central argument is that 
space is a process, or is constantly being produced, as opposed to an inanimate object.  
He does not accept the traditional belief of space being a physical area that is simply 
inhabited.  Instead, Lefebvre argues that actions and relations among people and 
processes join together to produce space (Lefebvre, 1991).  Public spaces allow for city 
inhabitants to engage in a social life.  Marcuse (2006) states public spaces are alive, 
diverse, and accessible to all and are symbols of a truly democratic city. 
 However, while urban planners are attempting to attract a certain type of citizen, 
it comes at the expense of other less desired individuals.  As public space is increasingly 
organized around consumerism, individuals who contribute by purchasing goods and 
services are welcomed, while those who do not or are unable are discouraged (Fyfe and 
Bannister, 1998; Turner, 2002).  Fyfe (1998) argues “purifying” and privatizing public 
spaces to support consumerism, at the expense of others, contributes to social exclusions 
and a sense of inequality for people.  Critics who deplore the loss of pubic space are also 
concerned with the reduction of a democratic public sphere rather than the loss of actual 
physical public space (Sorkin, 1992; Mitchell, 2003; Kohn, 2004).   
Blomley (2001) argues that public space only manifests itself when it is the site of 
the development of the public sphere and can only do so if it is occupied or actively 
creating public space for use as a political forum.  The public space and the political 
public sphere relationship are based on the understanding of citizenship and the 
perception of who is represented in the public sphere or who occupies public space.  
Representation and citizenship are related to visibility and making physical appearances 
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in public space (Young, 1990).  Mitchell (1995: 15) states, “By claiming space in public, 
by creating public space, social groups themselves become public.” Public spaces are the 
center of power and politics and provide many opportunities for interaction and 
representation (Gould, 1996).  The model of open freedom enables flow of dialogue, 
promoting active citizenship and enabling political representation.  Open cities are the 
forum for dissent and protest and where diverse users can state and discuss opposing 
opinions and viewpoints.           
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, defensive architecture through urban design was 
widely employed by urban planners in the United States as a result of research which 
suggested an association between particular types of environmental design and reduction 
of criminal activity (Gold, 1970).  These designs produced concerns that fortifying the 
urban environment was socially and economically detrimental and that the providers of 
urban security were starting to become privatized due to the lack of faith with municipal 
authorities to properly provide security within the urban environment.  Robert Gold 
(1970) noted that the urban environment was being fortified due to demands from 
citizens and that safety had become a commodity that was being bought and sold with 
real estate.   
Jane Jacobs was the first sociologist to propose analyzing the relationship 
between the physical environment and crime.  Jacobs (1961) noted in The Death and Life 
of Great American Cities how urban design could jeopardize community safety.  Her 
research criticized the urban renewal and slum clearance practices in the 1950s.  Jacobs 
(1961) found the urban planning practices as unnecessary and destroying older 
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neighborhoods.  Jacobs argued the older structures provided natural security techniques 
that were useful for the communities being studied.  For example, she referenced 
structures that were close to the street like stoops, porches, and street level windows, 
which allowed community members to bond and establish a sense of community.  
Removing these structures would decrease the ability to identify strangers, reduce social 
interaction and decrease the sense of overall security felt by community members.  As a 
result of these safety concerns, urban designers researched strategies to limit the 
opportunity of crime.   
This shift of concern was also in response to the race riots which plagued cities in 
the late 1960s, as well as the problems associated with design of high rise blocks, which 
were perceived as breeding grounds for criminal activity (Coaffee et al., 2009).  These 
high rise apartments were described as “indefensible space” (Newman, 1972).  Urban 
planners began to research how the manipulation of the physical environment could 
produce space that would limit and even suppress criminal behavior, especially 
opportunistic criminal activities.   
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) was developed by 
criminologist C. Ray Jeffery in 1971.  He suggested that the physical environment could 
be modified to produce space which would discourage criminal activity while at the same 
time maintaining social cohesion amongst law abiding citizens.  CPTED is based on four 
elements: natural surveillance, natural access control, territorial reinforcement, and 
maintenance.  Natural surveillance is a design concept with the primary purpose of 
keeping people under observation.  This can involve certain placement and design of 
windows, lighting, and landscaping features to deter criminal activity, through increased 
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observation, while providing space which encourages positive social interaction.  Natural 
access control utilizes elements such as doors, shrubs, fences, and gates to deter 
admission to a target and or victim and create a perception among potential offenders that 
there is a substantial risk in selecting the target/victim.  Jeffery’s third element of CPTED 
is territorial reinforcement.  The surrounding environment can be designed to clearly 
establish public and private spaces to the public.  Low walls, landscaping, and pavement 
patterns can create a sense of ownership which would then be perceived by would-be 
criminal offenders to stay away.  The final element is maintenance.  Jeffery ties 
maintenance into the Broken Windows Theory.  Deterioration of a space could indicate 
less control and concern by the owner and indicates a greater tolerance of disorder.  
Proper care and maintenance allows for the use of the space for its intended purpose.  
These elements would reduce opportunities for criminal activity to be committed and 
which would potentially reduce the level of fear of crime (Jeffery, 1971).  In later works, 
Jeffery (1978) believed that in order to reduce criminal activity the environment must be 
changed instead of spending time attempting to rehabilitate criminals.   
Jeffery’s work was soon followed by a number of studies on architectural crime 
deterrence.  Of all these studies, none evoked more debate than the publication of Oscar 
Newman’s Defensible Space – Crime Prevention through Urban Design.  This crime 
control model, which draws mainly upon Jeffery’s crime prevention through 
environmental design theory, is also based out of the public health model.  Rather than 
waiting for a particular disease to attack, Newman focuses on prevention and early 
diagnosis.  Newman’s defensible space theory engages in crime control, as well as trying 
to understand the underlying characteristics of high crime neighborhoods in order to more 
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effectively combat crime.  Newman’s work is also based upon Skinner’s operant learning 
theory.  People respond to the environment in a particular way in order to maximize 
pleasure and to minimize pain.  Newman believed by removing reinforcements for 
criminal behavior, the individual will not respond to an environmental stimulus to 
commit a criminal act, therefore reducing crime.         
Newman’s research on housing in New York and St. Louis led to the concept of 
defensible space.  Defensible space calls for thoughtful design strategies, with certain 
spatial features, to allow for residents to become key managers in ensuring their security.  
This concept can involve using a wide array of mechanisms, real and symbolic barriers as 
well as increased surveillance, which when combined would enable residents to be in 
control of the physical environment (Newman, 1972).  Defensible space was viewed as 
an expression of social fabric that could defend itself and could be achieved by the 
manipulation or repurposing of architectural and design principles (Coaffee et al., 2009).  
Newman also suggested that security fences and electronic surveillance technologies 
could be employed, but only as a last resort.  Defensible space is an alternative to target 
hardening measures which can include screening visitors, patrolling security guards and 
installing iron bars on doors and windows.  These target hardening measures can make 
public space uncomfortable and discourage a sense of community.   
Newman (1972) noted that anonymity within the city was associated with rises in 
the crime rate.  His research utilized crime statistics collected by the New York Police 
Department as well as his own data collected through resident interviews and building 
analysis.  He found increased crime rates in high rise apartment buildings when compared 
to lower rise buildings.  In high-rise buildings, 55 percent of criminal acts were 
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committed within interior spaces, when only 17 per percent of crime were committed in 
low-rise buildings in interior spaces (Newman, 1972).  Newman concluded that high rise 
building residents had little to no control or personal responsibility for spaces that were 
occupied by so many people.  With the increased sense of anonymity and danger that 
urban life involved, especially for residents in high rise apartments that did not appear to 
know or want to know each other, neighborhood crime prevention was made nearly 
impossible. 
The defensible space concept stresses physical communities of interest that have a 
common use for the space surrounding their environment.  If there is no community of 
interest, the space becomes unused and unsafe.  Therefore, a police presence can 
increase, and transform the space into a highly used semiprivate space; which could also 
be identified with a particular group of people, such as gangs, who use, maintain, and 
control it (Newman, 1980).  This would convert public space into a militarized 
semiprivate space.  The new semiprivate space would not limit access to non-residents, 
but attempt to ensure a well defined terrain by non-residents that would need the approval 
of the current resident population and meet their criteria of appropriate usage for non-
residents (Newman, 1980).  
Newman’s main premise was that most criminal offenders behave logically by 
selecting targets in relation to perceptions of high rewards and a low risk of getting 
caught.  Therefore crime deterrence was basically about giving potential criminal 
offenders a sense that if they invade a certain space, or boundary, they were likely to be 
observed and would have a difficult time escaping undetected.  Newman argued that 
outside spaces become more defensible if they are marked off with physical boundaries, 
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such as a fence or shrubbery, and were well illuminated.  However, space becomes 
indefensible when solid fences and tall walls are constructed; due to these objects serving 
as hiding places for would be criminals.  
Newman offered four design features that would create a secure residential 
environment: first, territoriality, which is achieved by the zoning of public space, mainly 
residential areas, to encourage a sense of community; second, natural surveillance, this 
occurs by designing the placement of people, activities, and physical features in such a 
way to maximize visibility; third, image, which is the capacity of the structural design to 
provide a sense of security; and finally, milieu, these are other physical features in the 
landscape that can be modified so they merge with areas of the city considered to be safe, 
such as police stations, or commercial areas.  Jacobs (1961) also advocated for mixed 
land use within the city to promote greater safety. 
Newman’s defensible space theories became a popular concept in the design of 
new residential communities, and were also used by many law enforcement agencies in 
the United Kingdom in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Coleman 1984, 1985; Dawson 
1984; Goodey and Gold, 1987).  Coleman (1984; 1985) proposed that the physical design 
of high rise housing in London and Oxford had a significant effect on the behavior of its 
residents and that more optimal conditions could be obtained by reorganizing access and 
layouts to housing estates to give residents more control over their immediate 
environment.  These concepts became popular with local British governments as they 
adopted highly restrictive ordinances in order to curtail their worst housing estates 
(Goodey and Gold, 1987).   
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 Newman’s theory was not without flaws.  Practically, the principles of defensible 
space are simple to implement, but it’s not always economical or possible to repurpose 
existing spaces.  The defensible space theory also suffered from theoretical problems as 
well.  Gold (1982) was highly critical of Newman’s defensible space theory, indicating 
that there were poor statistical analyses and unverifiable causal relationships between 
physical design and crime.  Many researchers (Mayhew, 1979; Poyner, 1983; 
Mandanipour, 1996; Tijerino, 1998) also had difficulty in accepting Newman’s modified 
belief of environmental determinism.  Hillier (1973) argued architectural design did not 
shape social behavior and that territoriality was not the main explanation for spatial 
behavior. 
 Several critics also believed Newman’s methods were methodologically flawed.  
Mawby (1977) found Newman’s research to be misleading; his research found London 
high-rise apartments did not have a higher crime rate when compared to low-rise 
apartments.  Mayhew (1979) also discovered the defensible space principles did not 
apply to cities in the United Kingdom.  Taylor, Gottfredson, and Brower (1980) stated the 
defensible space concept had many flawed and untested assumptions.  Taylor, et al 
(1980) points out one of the major flaws in Newman’s concept, showing that the 
surveillance aspect of the theory rested on the assumption that residents will engage in a 
policing function by making use of surveillance.  Mayhew (1979) confirmed their 
findings, stating only citizens empowered with the task, such as police, firemen, etc., will 
engage in surveillance. 
 Greenberg and Rohe (1984) conducted an empirical test analyzing the 
effectiveness of Newman’s defensible space theory and Jeffrey’s and Brantingham’s 
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target and opportunity model.  Greenberg and Rohe found less supportive evidence for 
Newman’s model, and more for the target and opportunity model.  Their study looked at 
the distribution of targets in relation to streets, vacant lots, housing units, commercial 
buildings, and parking lots experiencing high crime rates.  They found low volume 
streets, single-family homes, and a select few vacant plots and parking lots had lower 
crime rates.  
 Another problem often associated with the defensible space model is the problem 
of displacement.  By deterring crime originating in one locale, the motivated offender 
may simply choose an alternate target.  Therefore, the criminal act is merely displaced 
and not prevented.  Siegel (1995) suggests that environmental crime prevention may only 
produce short term benefits, but once criminals adjust their behavior to the new measures 
they will continue in criminal behavior.   
Newman’s defensible space model has influenced many theories and crime 
prevention projects.  In a more extreme case of architectural crime prevention, Poyner 
(1983), who took many queues from Newman’s work, proposed a simplistic architectural 
solution for every kind of criminal act.  Poyner stated that the layout of streets, 
neighborhoods, and communities could be designed in such a way to eliminate all 
criminal activity, although he never specifies what type of crime he is attempting to 
suppress.  He also advocates for the suppression of semi-public environments, such as 
platforms and decks, and a militaristic regulation of children density in personal 
residences.  Poyner envisioned a city where every facet of urban life could be observed 
and controlled. 
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Another crime prevention strategy which borrows heavily from Newman’s model 
is situational crime prevention.  Hirschi and Gottfredson (1986) asserted that criminality 
is a necessary condition, this alone is not sufficient for a criminal act to be committed; 
instead, crime requires situational incentives found in the form of motivation and 
opportunity.  Ronald Clarke became the most significant contributor to the situational 
crime prevention model.  Clarke (1983) focused the theory on the immediate physical and 
social settings, as well as the societal arrangements, rather than the individual perpetrator.  
Thereby, decreasing the amount of opportunities for crime by using specific measures, 
such as the management, design, or manipulation of the environment, for certain crimes, 
is a more effective approach than reforming the offender themselves (Clarke, 1983).  His 
crime prevention strategies were originally divided into three types of measures: target 
hardening measures, environmental management, and degree of surveillance.  The 
foundation of situational crime prevention relies upon the assumption that more 
opportunities lead to more criminal acts. 
The main strength of situational crime prevention is the scope of criminal acts of 
which it can be applied.  The core principles are deliberately broad and the prevention 
strategies can be applied to a wide array of crimes.  This applies to crimes that are 
political in nature, emotionally driven, opportunistic, sexual, or premeditated; they are all 
affected by situational characteristics.  For instance, homicide rates are heavily 
influenced by the easiness and accessibility of handguns.  The higher the availability, the 
higher the homicide rates (Clare, 1997).  Situational crime prevention relies on a broad 
collection of literature to support different crime prevention measures.               
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Poyner and Webb (1987) found that in increased utilization of access controls in 
British buildings, including fences and automated access to buildings reduced the amount 
of vandalism and theft when compared to buildings not using access controls.  Hunter 
and Jeffery (1992) concluded that having two clerks on duty in convenience stores, 
especially during night hours, was an effective prevention against robberies.  Both of 
these studies are examples of controlling access to facilities and increasing surveillance 
and place mangers to reduce the potential of crime, key components of the situational 
crime prevention model.  Researchers Birkbeck and LaFree (1993) determined that 
threat, frustration, and reward were continually found as situational correlates of crime, 
as well as the subjective experiences of the perpetrator.  According to their study, 
criminals choose, weigh, check, suspend, and alter the meanings of the situations they 
experience.   
The approach of environmental management, when the main objectives are 
independent of crime control, can also produce effective crime prevention measures.  In 
the United Kingdom, laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets were enacted to 
reduce fatal motorcycle accidents, but it has also indirectly reduced motorcycle thefts as 
thieves were unlikely to have a spare helmet and would be stopped and arrested by law 
enforcement (Mayhew, Clarke, Sturman, and Hough, 1976).  Clarke (1995) argued that 
criminal conduct was found to be influenced more by changes in opportunity and external 
motivations.  Research conducted by Scarr, 1973; Reppetto, 1974; and Waller and 
Okihiro, 1978, support Clarke’s argument through a series of interviews with convicted 
residential burglars which found that the avoidance of risk and minimizing effort is a key 
component of target selections decisions.   
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Situational crime prevention has also been largely criticized over the years.  Much 
like the criticisms of the defensible space model, displacement has been the main 
argument against situational crime prevention.  It is argued that the situational aspects of 
the theory may determine the timing and location of criminal acts, but reducing 
opportunities in a certain time and place results in displacing offenders to other times, 
places, or crimes with no net reduction in criminal acts (Clarke and Feslon, 1993).  
Displacement occurs when an offender may attempt to commit the crime elsewhere, at a 
different time, choose a different target or victim, or engage in a different type of crime 
(Reppetto, 1976). 
Other studies have also concluded that the displacement of criminal acts does 
occur and that situational prevention measures were a waste of time and resources.  
Mayhew et al. (1976) found reducing the potential for theft for new vehicles in the United 
Kingdom simply lead to older vehicles experiencing higher rates of theft.  Allatt (1984) 
established that target hardening techniques employed in a particular United Kingdom 
neighborhood decreased burglaries in the neighborhood, but was soon followed by an 
increase in property crimes in the surrounding neighborhoods.  Several studies examined 
the relationship between the allocations of police resources and the distribution of crime.  
In these studies, it was believed that areas with a decreased police presence would have 
higher crime rates due to offenders being spatially displaced.  This test was conducted for 
approximately 50 U.S. cites.  It was found that areas with a lower police presence did 
experience higher crime rates, especially for property crimes (Mehay, 1977 and 
Fabrikant, 1980).   
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Another argument against situational crime prevention is the cost of employing 
such crime measures.  Some techniques may be too expensive or unavailable to the 
average citizen.  Shover (1991) collected data on imprisoned property offenders on the 
effectiveness of various security measures.  He found the most effective crime prevention 
measures to be burglar alarms, electronic window sensors, CCTV cameras, and security 
patrols.   
While CPTED, defensible space, and situational crime prevention may make 
places safer, the question remains as to whether people feel any safer in these secured 
environments.  An urban dweller may be statistically less likely to experience a criminal 
act, but the person may not feel any safer.  Newman’s (1973) research found that constant 
surveillance in a particular space made pedestrians feel as if they were a hostile stranger 
who should not be in the fortified space. 
Since the work of Jeffery and Newman, CPTED and defensible space concepts have 
evolved over time to include new measures that include advanced technologies such as 
closed circuit television, access control, and tactics which include target hardening, to 
augment the natural surveillance of space (Moffat, 1983; Crowe, 2000).  Community 
safety is a far reaching issue, one of which many urban leaders and planners are 
attempting to create sustainable communities and to secure public spaces (Coaffee, 
Moore, Fletcher and Bosher, 2008).     
No Right to the City 
 Many researchers (Boddy, 2008; Purcell, 2008; Marcuse, 2005; Warren, 2002) 
argue that having a fortified public space erodes many public rights and privileges.  The 
concept of “right to the city” was first introduced by Henri Lefebvre.  Lefebvre (1968) 
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explained a right to the city is composed of three interrelated entitlements: the right to 
access physical urban space; the right to be social and interact with others; and the right 
to create space.  The first right allows anyone to be in public space.  However, this right 
to the city has been disrupted due to the modification of the physical urban landscape.  
These changes in the landscape are the most visible expression of urban security.  
Benton-Short (2007) argued that post September 11
th
 fortifications or architectures of 
terror, have created a segregated society.  These fortified landscapes are mostly found in 
densely populated cities which produce architecture of dis-assurance (Boddy, 2008).  
Architecture of dis-assurance is the sudden transformation of public space into defensive 
security measures, which in turn leaves surrounding residents questioning their own 
safety.  Boddy (2008) explains the Jersey barrier (Figure 1) is the most common form of 
this type of architecture.  He contrasts this visible security with passive-aggressive or 
invisible security measures.  These invisible features, such as artificial waterfalls used as 
a dividing walls or a building wrapping moats, are becoming more common and are now 
a statutory code requirement in some new development projects which include One 
World Trade Center also known as the Freedom Tower.   
 The second right to the city is the ability to live an urban lifestyle.  For example, a 
cosmopolitan lifestyle that provides the option to engage in interaction or to retreat into 
anonymity.  Marcuse (2005) believes this right allows people to live a diverse lifestyle 
where people gather to encounter one another and exchange ideas.  This lifestyle is 
potentially threatened by fortifications within the city and can create fear and distrust 
among inhabitants.  Davis (1990) contends that “the social perception or threat becomes a 
function of the security mobilization itself, not crime rates” (page 224).  The National 
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Capital Panning Commission (NCPC) reported in 2002 that a rapid and severe 
mobilization of urban security measures would increase fear and undermine the basic 
assumptions of an open and democratic society.   
 The third right to the city involves the ability to produce space and determine ones 
use of the space (Young, 1990).  This can entail suitable representation, participation and 
appropriation, and involves access to decision making processes (Purcell, 2008).  
However, when this right is invoked it is often in defiance of the owners, managers, or 
authorities who seek to limit undesirable actions in public space.  These undesirable 
actions include acts of protest, dissent, or resistance to hegemonic powers threatening this 
right of representation (Mitchell, 2003).  The curtailment of this right can also refer to the 
reduced use of public space by certain populations, especially those wishing to express 
political dissent or wanting to exercise their freedom of assembly.  The War on Terror is 
a perfect example of this right restriction.  Warren (2002) argues that city officials use 
security concerns to justify the “repression, prevention and control” of city inhabitants 
wanting to engage in political mobilization activities.  The right to the city concept allows 
one to understand that public space is linked to the creation of a public realm, and that the 
public realm is being eroded by an inclusive and or exclusive form of public space.  With 
the implementation of anti-terror security measures, which are meant to protect 
inhabitants and key infrastructure, are potentially homogenizing and normalizing space 
and denying the right for a true experience of urban life (Flusty, 1994; Savitch, 2008). 
Privatization, Urban Fortification, and Anti-Terrorism Security 
 Critics believe that the privatization of public space points to the loss of the public 
realm and the erosion of democratic expression and that privatized spaces prioritizes 
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citizens, as opposed to fostering interaction among diverse social groups (Crawford, 
1992; Kohn, 2004).   However, Garvin (2002) supports the use of private sector entities 
to aid public needs in urban spaces, mainly due to the ability of these entities to 
rejuvenate deteriorating urban centers.  With current re-development efforts in U.S. 
cities, municipalities are allowing for private investment entities to create and manage 
open spaces.  However, it must be noted there are consequences of public spaces that are 
owned and managed by entities other than the government.   
Banerjee (2001) offered three critical trends that add to the recent increase in 
privatized urban spaces.  The first trend involves the increased use of private entities, 
rather than the government agencies, to provide public goods and services.  This parallels 
the government’s recent reduction in providing services to the public (Banerjee, 2001).  
The second is the expansion of transnational corporations and their focus on the global 
economy over local interests.  According to this trend, cities are viewed only as places of 
investment, rather than sites of social collaboration.  The final trend Banerjee states that 
is the advancement of technology and communication has transformed social interactions 
and altered traditional beliefs of place and location. 
 While researching gated communities, Low (2003) found cities have a strong 
incentive to privatize public spaces, because developers then take over accountability for 
constructing and maintaining infrastructures such as roads or providing services such as 
security patrols or trash collection.  Low (2003) also found residents living within 
privatized spaces experienced a heightened sense of fear and insecurity due to a lack of 
social interaction.  Kohn (2004) argues that the privatization of public space is the 
warning sign for the disintegration of the public realm.  He believes privatized spaces can 
52 
 
 
prioritize public consumption for specific urban dwellers, as opposed to allowing diverse 
groups access to these spaces.  Valentine (1996) and Wilson (1991) have both found 
some public spaces can constrain female use and reinforce oppressive gender relations.  
Many researchers believe, with governmental approval of the privatization of public 
space, it will lead to the total withdrawal of citizens from the civic realm leading to the 
“end of public space.” (Banerjee, 2001; Kohn, 2004; Sorkin, 1992).  
 Since the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks, public and private officials have pushed 
for implementation of anti-terror security as the rationale for increased security and 
fortification of streets, sidewalks and public spaces (Mitchell, 2003).  Urban 
administrators use the threat of a potential terrorist attack as their justification to increase 
security measures for many public buildings (Nemeth and Hollander, 2010).  Some claim 
the security measures used limit civil liberties by controlling behavior, restricting 
movement and eroding the quality of life in cities (Marcuse, 2002).  Savitch (2008) 
believed security enhancements allow for ensuring certainty, order and homogeneity.  
However, the essence of a city lies in its diversity, openness and difference; without the 
opportunity to interact with other city dwellers urban life becomes no more (Savitch, 
2008). 
 Marcuse (2002) describes how high profile public space has become noticeably 
less public due to city officials limiting access, controlling and inhibiting activities which 
are considered “normal to a democratic society.” Marcuse (2006) explains the city has 
now been secured from the public rather than for the public.  Both Graham (2004) and 
Marcuse (2004; 2006) believe that anti-terror policies are used to curtail rights and 
undermine public dissent, social activism and protest.  Warren (2002) argues the public 
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officials implementing the War on Terror have covertly used policies to legitimize the 
repression and control of mass political mobilization within cities.   
 Marcuse (2006) provides the key difference between safety and security: safety 
refers to the actual protection from danger while security is the perceived protection from 
danger.  Marcuse explains how anti-terror officials employ a rhetoric of security to create 
limitations on the right to public space.  However, a recent study by Nemeth and 
Hollander (2010) has shown that levels of fear in public space do not always decrease as 
security increases, as well as an increase in safety does not always increase feelings of 
overall security.  Koskela (2008) argues that urban fear is produced from threats of 
global, ideological terror rather than from the risk of local or petty crime.  While an 
individual can avoid certain situations that jeopardize their safety, threats of terror, 
according to Koskela (2008), is perceived to be out of the public’s control.   
 Federal planners and designers are tasked with designing out terror, which creates 
a situation of “form follows fear” (Ellin, 1997).  Creating feelings of safety is a critical 
component of successful urban projects (Talen, 2008), but critics often point out how 
secured spaces within cities increase fear and distrust.  The fundamental question urban 
planners must ask themselves is how to balance anti-terror measures to secure city space 
and reduce public fear while not making inhabitants feel less safe.  As Davis (1990) 
explains, the social perception of danger becomes a function of the security mobilization, 
and not actual criminal acts.  Nemeth and Hollander (2010) also contend that over 
secured public spaces has a negative impact on the marginal groups of our society; 
mainly the poor, ethnic minorities, and the homeless.    
54 
 
 
 Boddy (2008) explains how there are two types of security present in cities.  The 
first type of security is described as “an architecture of dis-assurance,” which is most 
commonly associated with obvious physical barriers.  These include Jersey barriers, 
surveillance cameras and bollards (Figure 2) which are easily perceived symbols of 
security; however, they may not be effective at preventing an actual terrorist attack. 
The second type of security is called “a passive-aggressive urban design style.” 
This includes defensive measures such as tiered open space plazas surrounding high 
value buildings to prevent truck bombs or a city street constructed of composite fill which 
is set to collapse under the extreme weight of a truck carrying a bomb. These new 
security measures are starting to become the norm in major global cities.   
The Emergence of Security Zones 
 The first notable appearance of a security zone appeared in 1983 with the 
installation of a Jersey barrier in front of the White House in response to the Beirut 
barracks bombings.  However, security zones did not fully develop until 1995, in answer 
to the Oklahoma City bombing, when security officials closed off Pennsylvania Avenue 
in front of the White House.  The federal government’s street closing was generally 
criticized as having a “bunker mentality” (Hoffman and Chalk, 2002).   
Cities are dependent upon an open, diverse and tolerant environment, and the 
most observable security measures often increase fear, minimize the public realm and rob 
the city of its openness and vibrancy (Savitch, 2008).  The National Capital Planning 
Commission (NCPC) expressed concern that implementing visible security measures 
would increase fear and undermine the basic premises of the city being an open and 
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democratic society (Boddy, 2008).  Unfortunately, federal planners mainly install visible 
security measures, such as a Jersey barrier or bollard, to harden potential targets.   
 After the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Buildings in Oklahoma 
City, OK, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), whose primary purpose is to 
manage and support the basic functioning of federal agencies, produced a report 
suggesting that all government buildings be identified as “public assets” and should be 
retrofitted with perimeter security measures responding to an explicit set of criteria 
(GSA, 1999).  Shortly after the GSA’s report, the NCPC (2002) developed the first 
perimeter security standards for the Federal Triangle in Washington D.C., and later added 
upon these standards in 2005.  It should be noted that the Federal Triangle is a triangular 
area in Washington D.C. which houses key Federal agencies including: the Federal Trade 
Commission, National Archives Building, Department of Justice Headquarters, 
Department of Commerce Headquarters, the Environmental Protection Agency as well as 
a the Federal Triangle Metro Station.  Since the Oklahoma City Bombing, many of the 
pedestrian areas within the Federal Triangle have been restricted to federal employees or 
those with official business.  The National Capital Planning Commission’s 2005 
signature planning report includes explicit terminology of security zones which are 
referred to as a secured “layer” of perimeter space around public buildings.  The layer of 
perimeter space concept was quickly adopted by federal agencies and cities around the 
country (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005).   
 The NCPC defined a space by breaking it into three separate zones: the building 
yard, the sidewalk, and finally the curb or parking lane.  A particular site is divided to 
allow distance requirements to protect a building from an explosion detonated from the 
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street or sidewalk.  Each security zone is subject to different levels of public uses, 
obstruction and surveillance.  Security zones were originally designed to improve the 
safety of the building and its occupants, with no consideration for social, economic, 
aesthetic, or transportation considerations.  Both the concept and mechanisms of security 
zones were intended to be temporary; however, Coaffee et al. (2009) argues security 
zones have started to establish permanence in the contemporary urban landscape. 
 Security zones are considered a specialized category of land use called marginal 
spaces (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005).  Conventional open spaces are designed; such as 
parks and plazas.  However, marginal spaces are created as by-products of urban spatial 
development and remain as inferior spaces (Garde, 1999).  Zoning, security requirements, 
and land use regulations typically result in marginal spaces.  The central problem of 
security zones is they are not normally designed or planned for.  Instead they instantly 
materialize or evolve on a site and create a unique problem for urban spaces.  Marginal 
spaces are argued to have negative impacts on city blocks, neighborhoods, and urban 
space in general (Garde, 1999).  Marginal spaces reduce the number of productive uses 
for urban areas.  Security zones are marginal spaces developed as a result of enhancing 
the security of urban space.  As with other marginal spaces, security zones have negative 
impacts.  Security zones intensify the discomforting nature of marginal spaces (Garde, 
1999).  These spaces can turn a bustling, dynamic street into a deserted town.  Active 
shopping centers are turned into empty storefronts.  Security zones and restricted roads 
can scare people and businesses away for blocks.   
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The Fortified City 
 The response to urban insecurity has been dramatic, particularly in Los Angeles, 
CA during the late 1980s and early 1990s, where some have argued that the 
implementation of anti-crime measures had been taken to the extreme (Coaffee, 2009).  
During that time, Los Angeles was portrayed as an urban testing ground, with an 
overemphasis on urban militarization and extreme anti-crime measures (Davis, 1990; 
1995; 1998; Flusty, 1994; and Crawford, 1995).  The obsession with urban security lead 
to these anti-crime measures manifesting themselves into the urban landscape.  For 
example, Blakely and Snyder (1995) found that 16 percent of Los Angeles residents were 
living in some form of a secured access setting.  The transformation of Los Angeles into 
a fortress city also reflected the middle class paranoia combined with the necessity of 
economic activity.  It has been argued that the privatization of public space and 
implemented security measures was a systemic effort by corporate Los Angeles to protect 
its economic interests by excluding individuals and groups who were not necessary, or 
dangerous, to the continuing profit margin of the city’s new globalized economy 
(Haywood, 2004).     
 Mike Davis is the primary researcher who outlined how urban authorities and 
private citizen groups in Los Angeles responded to the increase fear of crime by 
militarizing the urban landscape.  In City of Quartz (1990), Davis portrays Los Angeles 
as a miserable and oppressed place, with the Los Angeles Police Department engaged in 
territorial defensive measures.  Davis (1990) explains how urban design, architecture, and 
the police apparatus are merged into a comprehensive security effort.   
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The fortification of commercial buildings and their borders become strongpoints 
of sale (Flusty 1994).  Coaffee (2009) notes defensible space, which is primarily utilized 
on a micro level scale, is employed at a meso and macro level scale in Los Angeles.  This 
wide scale use of defensible space is employed primarily to protect city properties and 
residences through target hardening and various forms of surveillance.  Davis (1990) 
maintains the militarization of Los Angeles leads to an increase of repression in public 
access and movement.  Haywood (2004) also compares how security and surveillance in 
Los Angeles are as valuable as floor space; while the community, instead of making 
investments in health and education, are forced to invest in physical security measures 
instead.  
Los Angeles, with its intensified security apparatus, has often been described as 
postmodern urbanism (Dear and Flusty, 1998; Dear, 1999).  Davis portrays fear and 
anxiety in Los Angeles as an outcome of economic disparities created by the negative 
consequences of increased capitalism.  Dear and Flusty’s (1998) explanation of 
postmodern urbanism within Los Angeles is focused on the social, political, and 
economic inequalities appearing in fortified and privatized spaces.  
Steven Flusty (1994) elaborates on Davis’s work by arguing that an extensive 
cloud of security and surveillance has covered Los Angeles, and attempts to understand 
this phenomenon by categorizing the different types of fortified space.  Flusty refers to 
these fortified security spaces as “interdictory space,” which is primarily designed to 
intercept, repel and or filter individuals.  The five types of interdictory spaces are: 
stealthy space, which is often hidden from normal view by buildings and is a passive 
aggressive design measure; slippery space, which cannot normally be accessed by 
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uninterrupted approaches; crusty space, which is block by walls, barriers, and 
checkpoints; prickly space, are areas that are uncomfortable to occupy; and finally jittery 
space, which are areas pervasive with surveillance devices.   
Although Davis has influenced academics studying urban fortification, he has also 
had his share of critics.  The main criticism is that Davis was selling fear and anxiety 
about living in Los Angeles (Stewart, 1998).  Friedman (1998) also expands this 
argument by stating Los Angeles is painted as the most dangerous city in the United 
States.  Despite the landscape of fear present in Angeles, other researchers stress these 
defensive trends are not widespread and appear to be localized to Los Angeles 
(Merrifield, 1997).       
Planning for Urban Security 
 In order to gain a better understanding on how the physical security landscape is 
defined and validated, existing management policies governing security zones must be 
reviewed.  Due to the risk of exposing confidential information to the public, security 
zones on public or private spaces are not officially listed on zoning or planning 
documents.  However, the planning and application of security zones does not occur 
without specific guidelines. For example, current and future Department of Defense 
facilities are now designed and upgraded for progressive collapse avoidance, have 
minimum standoff distances for personnel and vehicles, building overhang avoidance and 
or hardening, mailroom modification or relocation for isolation and ventilation purposes, 
building and structural isolation (decentralization), as well as mandatory polyvinyl-
butyral glazing of all windows and skylights for high impact projectile resistance.  These 
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are only several examples from the recently adopted Department of Defense Minimum 
Antiterrorism Standards.    
 Urban security policy has become decentralized since the September 11
th
 terrorist 
attacks (Ervin, 2009).  Since the federal government does not have a specific organization 
that deals with urban security, each city has its own guidelines for dealing with perceived 
terrorist threats (Bugliarello, 2005).  Unfortunately, even the largest municipalities are 
not properly equipped to develop and implement a comprehensive urban security policy.  
Therefore, many cities have called upon the private sector to support such urban security 
agendas.  Due to the fact that many key urban assets are owned and operated by the 
private sector, they have become responsible for preventing acts of terrorism on their 
properties.  Critical homeland security operations have shifted from governmental to 
nongovernmental organizations and the obligation of combating terrorist threats is now 
placed upon developers, businesses and other civil societal entities (Bugliarello, 2005).   
 Governments have created public and private partnerships which are designed to 
address terrorism by the free sharing of information between these partnerships.  For 
example, New York City engages in interagency coordination to allow private sector 
security agents’ access to national counterterrorism intelligence; the expertise of these 
agents is called upon to ensure essential city infrastructure is protected from a potential 
terrorist strike (Ervin, 2008).  In New York City these interagency collaborations include: 
Infragard, which is a program aimed at infrastructure protection and includes officials 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the New York Police Department 
(NYPD); Shield Program, an association of police officials and private sector agencies to 
help protect critical assets; and finally the Joint Terrorism Task Force, a program 
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overseen by the U.S. Department of Justice that teams local police departments with FBI 
specialists.  The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has Operation Archangel which 
is identical to the NYPD’s Shield Program, and Los Angeles also has the Homeland 
Security Advisory Council which coordinates over 300 private security experts with 
LAPD officers with counterterrorism expertise.   
 The flow of intelligence between public and private allows for improved building 
standards, rating systems and guidelines which trickle down from a federal level to local.  
Urban planners and local authorities are increasingly requiring anti-terrorism measures as 
part of private building permit applications.  As a result, private security officials, 
architects and designers are now called upon to design new security measures to 
buildings and public spaces.  Security planning is starting to become normalized in 
everyday building activities, and many professionals are allowing the systematic target 
hardening of key urban assets as concerns move away from public to private entities and 
prioritizing law enforcement and security concerns (Marcuse, 2004).  These fortifications 
can lead to a separation of those who are “security cleared” from those who are 
considered risky, and feed into a culture of fear (Ellin, 1996).  With public spaces being 
fortified, cities now have elites that cut themselves off within fortified bunkers and 
government coalitions that work to create new systems of securitization within urban life 
(Graham, 2010).   
 To combat urban terrorism, governments have focused more on collaboration than 
on intervention (Coaffee et al., 2009).  Security decision making is being shifted from the 
national to local level, as well as from public to private entities with the creations of 
consortiums and intelligence sharing programs.  As urban security policy moves away 
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from federal guidelines, Bugliarello (2005) argues the general public will be more 
accepting of such security implementations.   
Risks of Security Zones and Urban Fortification 
 When sociologists such as Jane Jacobs, C. Ray Jeffery, and Oscar Newman began 
to develop design principles that would prevent crime, their ideas received a large amount 
of criticism.  Fortified architecture was perceived as oppressive and gave an appearance 
of a prison like atmosphere (Katyal, 2002).  However, with advances in design concrete 
can be modified to enhance visibility, access barriers can be aesthetically pleasing; and 
plastics can be utilized that appear to be welcoming, but are actually stronger than most 
metals.   
Architecture can serve as a regulatory force (Katyal, 2002).  Structural design can 
be substituted or used in combination with customary governing mechanisms like laws or 
social norms (Shah and Kesan, 2007).  The question remains as to how security 
zones/urban fortification can influence and affect human behavior.  The influence can be 
minimal by encouraging communication through the placement of certain objects within 
the interior of buildings.  At the opposite side of the spectrum, movement can be 
restricted and people’s ability to interact with others can be curtailed.         
Public space is structured to encourage or discourage social interactions (Shah 
and Kesan, 2007).  For example, Osmond (1957) showed that hallways generally 
discouraged social interactions, while circular rooms encouraged communication.  Much 
like Poyner’s previously mentioned argument for controlling all facets of space, the 
design of buildings can effectively dominate and control people in an orderly fashion 
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(Shah and Kesan, 2007).   Foucault (1979) highlighted the importance of surveillance in 
penalizing people.   
Foucault’s research, based upon Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, found a prisoner 
in a panopticon would feel as if they are always being watched.  A panopticon is a 
cylindrical wall of prison towers surrounding a central tower.  The tower allows for a 
guard to observe inmates without them knowing if and when they are being watched.  
Out of fear, the panopticon would maintain order over numerous inmates through 
surveillance (Markus, 1993).  Foucault (1979) found that the architectural setup of the 
panopticon disciplined its subjects through surveillance. 
Video surveillance of urban public space is also a potential risk of security zone 
implantation.  Davis (1990) argues that CCTV cameras linked to police stations cause 
urban dwellers to feel less safe due to the social perception of a potential threat.  Prior to 
September 11
th
, only 13 city police departments in the U.S. were utilizing CCTV 
surveillance cameras to monitor urban public spaces.  In the months after September 11
th
, 
25 city police departments were actively using CCTV cameras (Nieto, Johnston-Dodds, 
and Simmons, 2002).  The increase of CCTV cameras in major US cities since the 
September 11
th
 attacks is cause for concern and raises issues with privacy and public 
uneasiness.  Although little research has been conducted on police surveillance and 
CCTV cameras in the U.S., research in the United Kingdom has shown a racial bias in 
police officers CCTV monitoring of citizens (Norris and Armstrong, 1997).  Norris and 
Armstrong (1997) found: black people were 1.5 to 2.5 times more likely to be surveilled 
than a white person, and 30% of targeted surveillances on black people were prolonged, 
lasting nine minutes or more, compared to 10% with white people.   
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Fyfe and Bannister (1998) demonstrated how surveillance of citizens has proven 
mostly unsuccessful in major cities; that is crime rates in surveilled areas have decreased 
only to have crime displaced to other locations.  Bianchini (1990) states the use of CCTV 
cameras leads to the disenfranchisement of citizens who do not conform to the perceived 
social norm of a well regulated public space.  As CCTV surveillance continues to show 
signs of excluding certain individuals, it curtails the notion of the city being an open and 
accessible form of space (Fyfe and Bannister, 1998; Walzer, 1986).  Further research in 
the area may be needed with the dramatic increase in CCTV video surveillance after the 
September 11
th
 terrorist attacks.   
With the continuous threat of urban terrorism, many cities have regularly planned 
for terrorist strikes with advanced security design features that are constantly being 
updated (Coaffee and Rodgers, 2008; Haynes, 1995; Hoffman, 1998).  Studies have 
shown that if a public urban space is susceptible or perceived by the community to be at 
risk from a terrorist attack, there is a reduction in business confidence and an increase in 
public anxiety (Brown, 1985; Compton, Murray, and Osborne, 1980; Jarman 1993).  The 
constant fortification of space can lead to businesses relocating from the threatened area 
as well as the unwillingness of citizens to visit certain parts of the city.  During the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army’s bombing campaign of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, businesses were in favor of high levels of security to ease public concerns over 
safety (Brown, 1985).  Brown (1985) also found that terrorism did increase fears for 
public safety, which lead to the increased fortification of the city of Belfast.      
 Since the 1960s, terrorists have particularly targeted military organizations, 
government buildings, elected leaders, and particular racial or ethnic groups (Rees, 
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2006).  However, during the 1990s the tendency of terrorists shifted towards economic 
targets, with the main purpose of creating economic disruption, social nervousness, and 
applying political stress on governments (Coaffee, 2000).  Terrorist targeting began to be 
focused against business districts, transportation networks, or critical infrastructure 
(Coaffee, 2009).  Important financial centers became desirable targets because of their 
cosmopolitan workforce, devastating side effects of economic disruption, and mass media 
coverage and publicity of targeting such a building (Coaffee, 2009).  Such economic 
targets include: the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks, 1993 Bombay attacks, 
2005 London Attacks, 2007 Yazidi community bombings, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. 
 Terrorism over the last fifteen years has had a huge effect upon the contemporary 
urban landscape in areas perceived to be at risk (Savitch, 2008; Coafee, 2009).  Coaffee 
(2009) notes with the Provisional Irish Republic Army bombings of Belfast, which 
eventually lead to the creation of a “ring of steel” surrounding the city, there was a 
profound influence on the look of the city, the way occupants utilized the space, and how 
they felt about being present within the fortified walls.   
 Putting all of this together, the overall impact security zones have on the urban 
landscape is realized.  The city landscape is fortified and placed in a state of perpetual 
vigilance in response to a perceived threat that may never arrive.  Access to the city has 
now become restricted, and residents and visitors are no longer able to freely explore the 
landscape.  Citizens are filtered through spaces in order to ensure the desired individual is 
occupying the correct space.  Once beautiful architecture is now littered with CCTV 
cameras, bollards, and crash rated planters.  Social and public activities are increasingly 
becoming privatized.  The rich, living in citadels, or gated buildings which provide 
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private security, restaurants, gyms, transportation, and entertainment, become 
increasingly segregated from the poor.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
Methodology of Identifying and Analyzing Fortified Urban Space 
 Critics and researchers both address the issue of a decaying public realm in 
present day cities, but few empirically assess the extent of the fortification of the urban 
landscape in public spaces.  And some critics assume that anti-terror measures employed 
around high-profile targets creates a “landscape of fear” (Sorkin, 2004).  No researchers 
attempt to conceptualize the “district-wide security apparatus,” instead they provide 
limited analyses of individual and iconic spaces (Miller, 2007).  If different fortification 
measures produce varying visual, perceptional and representational meanings it is 
paramount to empirically study the fortification of our cities. 
To better understand the emerging phenomena of security zones and fortifying 
urban public space, this dissertation will examine security zones located in the civic and 
financial business districts in three U.S. cities: Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis.  
According to the 2010 Census, Chicago ranks as the third most populated city in the 
United States, while Indianapolis comes in at twelve and Detroit at eighteen.  Major 
global cities such as London and New York, having all experienced terrorist attacks, are 
recognized as the standard of interagency collaboration and proactive planning against 
terrorist attacks (Ervin, 2008).  However, there is virtually nothing written about recent 
security policies or changing urban space in Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis. 
Nemeth (2010) studied the location and intensity of security zones located in New 
York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.  This study provided a glimpse as to what security 
zones look like and where they manifest themselves.  However, there were several 
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oversights in Nemeth’s study as well as intriguing questions that need to be answered.  
First, Nemeth only examined Tier I cities and ignored Tier II cities.  New York, Los 
Angeles and San Francisco were three of the top five cities to receive the most funding 
from the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Area Security Initiative from 2002 
through 2012 (Coburn, 2012).   Research is needed to compare Tier I cities security 
landscape to Tier II cities.   
Although Nemeth’s research did identify security zones present in New York, Los 
Angeles, and San Francisco, he did not identify the zones influence on surrounding urban 
public space.  Using an inverse distance weight interpolation on the security zone 
phenomena allows for a true representation and displays the overall invasive nature of 
security zones in urban public space.  Nemeth also compared security zones against civic 
and financial districts.  For this research, civic and financial districts were fused together 
for a more realistic sense of security zones in the urban core of the selected cities.     
Nemeth’s study also analyzed several policy variables that were not included in 
this study.  Nemeth’s policy findings suggested security zones were the most intense 
when it was controlled by federal and local policies.  For this study, the policy variables 
were removed and replaced with a category of determining if the building was either 
publicly owned (city, county, and federal) or privately owned to determine if security 
zones were more intense in these types of buildings.    
For the surveillance criteria, Nemeth chose not to include CCTV cameras.  In a 
previous study, Nemeth (2009) estimates 95% of buildings in midtown Manhattan to 
have some type of CCTV camera surveillance present.  With prior research suggesting a 
racial bias in police surveillance of citizens (Norris and Armstong, 1997) and Foucault’s 
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(1979) study establishing that surveillance can be used as a form as punishment, it would 
seem the inclusion of CCTV video surveillance cameras would be a necessity for such a 
study.  For these reasons, CCTVs were included in the surveillance category for this 
study. 
Once the intensity and spatial extent of the urban security zones are identified, 
this study will then compare the effects on social and commercial activity within the 
identified security zones to areas outside of the identified security zones.  The social and 
commercial activity data used for this study will be population rates, crime rates, and 
office space rental rates from 2000 through 2010.  Crime rates will consist of crimes 
against persons and crimes against property.  Crimes against persons will include: 
robbery, battery, assault, homicide, and criminal sexual assault.  Crimes against property 
comprises of: theft, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and arson.  This dissertation provides a 
visual representation of the security zone extent and intensity in these cities, and it will 
also offer an explanation of the impact security zones have on commercial and social 
activities within the sample areas.  
This dissertation will add to existing literature on security and public space and 
also expand upon Sampson’s definition of social mechanisms to include anti-terrorism 
security zones appearing in response to the threat of terrorism.  The study will quantify 
the loss and or fortification of public space and measure the intensity of these spaces in 
three major U.S. cities.  While previous studies have described the spatial impacts of anti-
terror security, none have conducted empirical assessments outside of global cities like 
New York (Marcuse, 2006), London (Coaffee, 2009), Washington D.C. (Benton-Short, 
2007) and Jerusalem (Savitch, 2008).  This analysis will measure the spatial extent and 
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intensity of security zones in urban space and determine whether cities with substantially 
smaller population and density numbers (Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit) have 
fortified buildings, areas, and neighborhoods; and also restrict or close off public space in 
their civic and financial districts, similar to larger global cities such as New York, 
London, and Madrid.     
 Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis have been selected for numerous reasons. First, 
each city is listed in the Department of Homeland Security’s 2010 Urban Area Security 
Initiative List.  The United States Department of Homeland Security have identified these 
cities as high risk targets for future terrorist strikes and receive federal funding in 
response to this threat.    The DHS considers Chicago to be a Tier I urban area due to its 
high population density and high risk for threats (DHS, 2010).  An analysis of this type of 
city is likely to expose fortification measures at their most extreme.   Detroit and 
Indianapolis are considered Tier II cities.  These cities were selected in order to 
determine the level of security differences between Tier I and II type cities.   
 Second, it is informative to analyze both civic and financial districts in cities other 
than New York, London, etc., if there is to be a better understanding whether security 
measures differ in relation to the size and population density of cities.  Therefore, this 
dissertation will examine fortified spaces within both civic center districts, which are 
comprised mainly of public buildings and governmental structures, and financial business 
districts which encompass major banks and other financial institutions.  The 
concentration of high-profile corporate headquarters and governmental buildings make 
these areas prime targets for high profile terrorist attacks (Savitch, 2008).  Although more 
iconic public spaces can be found outside these districts, studying these districts offers a 
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more in-depth understanding of whether significant physical or regulatory differences 
occur within these districts, and or around public or private buildings. 
 Finally, the districts studied within each city, differ in population, density, size, 
and geographic location.  Each city offers a very different expression of public space.  
This study considers public space to be: publicly or privately owned exterior space 
legally required to allow public access, including all plazas, parks, sidewalks, and 
pedestrian streets where motorized traffic is forbidden.  Privately owned spaces, such as 
corporate plazas, are still publicly accessible, but might present different obstacles or 
prioritize use for employees over the general public. 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the presence and intensity of security zones 
will be analyzed in the civic center and financial district neighborhoods of three cities: 
Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis.  A security landscape is the aggregate geography of 
individual security zones in a certain geographic location.  A security zone is a restricted 
area located around a public or private building that has a combination of access 
restrictions, behavioral controls, or other security measures.  These individual zones 
embody a security landscape and can be located on either public or private property and 
enforced and managed by private developers and property managers or governmental 
entities.   
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Chicago 
 
Figure 3: Chicago Central Loop 
The first site selected was the central loop in the City of Chicago.  The central 
loop is located within Chicago’s Loop neighborhood which is also considered the central 
business district for Chicago.  The central loop contains the commercial center as well as 
all major governmental entities in the City of Chicago.  The city of Chicago is considered 
a Tier I city by the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Areas Security Initiative 
and has received $477,545,452 in federal funding from 2003 through 2012 to combat 
terrorism (Coburn, 2012).  The boundaries of the central loop are West Wacker Drive and 
East Van Buren Street for north and south; and State Street and Wells Street for east and 
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west.  The boundaries were taken from the City of Chicago’s official website.  The 
population of the sample area was obtained by adding up Census block level population 
numbers from the 2010 Census.  The exact 2010 population the central Loop is 2,044 (IL 
Cook County - Census Tract 8391, Block Group 1).  The area being examined is 0.219 
square miles; 137.272 acres; and 6,031,486.895 square feet. 
Indianapolis 
 
Figure 4: Downtown Indianapolis (Central Business District) 
The second area selected was downtown Indianapolis’ Central Business District.   
The boundaries are taken from the Indianapolis Regional Center Plan 2020 report.  The 
Indianapolis Regional Center Plan 2020 was prepared by the City of Indianapolis, the 
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Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee, Indianapolis Downtown INC., and Ball State 
University’s College of Architecture and Planning.  The boundaries are Michigan Street 
to Maryland Street for north and south; and North Delaware Street to Capitol Avenue for 
east and west.  Indianapolis is considered a Tier II city on the Urban Areas Security 
Initiative and has received $50,774,706 in federal funding, from 2003 through 2012, to 
combat terrorist activities (Coburn, 2012).  The exact population of the sample area is 
581 (IN - Marion County - Census Tract 3910, block group 3).  The area being examined 
is 0.226 square miles; 142.357 acres; and 6,363,793.282 square feet.   
Detroit 
 
Figure 5: Downtown Detroit 
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 The third area examined will be Downtown Detroit.  Downtown Detroit contains 
a designated central business district.  The boundaries were defined from the National 
Register of Historic Places listing in Downtown and Midtown Detroit.  The boundaries 
are Michigan Avenue and Monroe Street for north and Jefferson Avenue for south.  
Randolph Street and Washington Boulevard are the boundaries for east and west.  The 
City of Detroit is also considered a Tier II city and has received $132,614,497 in federal 
funding from 2003 through 2012 (Coburn, 2012).  The exact population for the sample 
area is 303 (MI - Wayne County - Census Tract 5208, Block Group 1 and Census Tract 
5172, Block Group 1).  The area for Downtown Detroit is 0.103 square miles; 64.46 
acres; and 2,834,124.051 square feet. 
Collection of Data 
Because the level of security zone restrictions vary from zone to zone, a simple 
and objective set of criteria is used to distinguish methods and classify security zones and 
security landscapes based on their overall level of restriction and or the presence and 
intensity of certain benchmarks (see Table 2).  Access restrictions will include: bollards, 
Jersey barriers, gates, or fences located at entrance and exit points to a space or building.  
Behavioral controls include posted signs prohibiting activities like photography or 
loitering, or physical features that discourage sitting or gathering in small or large groups.  
Surveillance measures will include security guards/police officers and other human 
surveillance.  Closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras are also included under 
surveillance.  Zone level data on seven descriptive variables (see Table 1) will be 
collected.    
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Table 1.  Security zone analysis variables 
    Variable name   Description of variable   Type of variable  Coding 
Tier Tier type of city Dichotomous 0 = Tier I urban 
area 
1 = Tier II urban 
area 
Control (Total) Total score of 
security zone 
classification 
criteria 
(Behavior + 
surveillance + 
access) 
Ordinal 1-2 = Low 
security 
3-4 = Moderate 
security 
5-6 = High 
security  
Control 
(Behavior) 
Behavior score of 
security 
classification 
criteria 
Ordinal 0 = No restriction 
1 = Minor 
restriction 
2 = Major 
restriction 
Control 
(Surveillance) 
Surveillance score 
of security 
classification 
criteria 
Ordinal 0 = No restriction 
1 = Minor 
restriction 
2 = Major 
restriction 
Control 
(Access) 
Access score of 
security 
classification 
criteria 
Ordinal 0 = No restriction 
1 = Minor 
restriction 
2 = Major 
restriction 
Building 
owner 
Ownership of 
building at which 
security zone is 
located 
Dichotomous 0 = Public 
1 = Private 
Duration Permanence of 
physical barriers 
found within zone 
Dichotomous 0 = Temporary 
1 = Permanent 
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Table 2.  Classification and criteria for security zone control variables. 
    No restriction  Minor restrictions      Major restrictions 
      (0 = Points)       (1 = Point)           (2 = points) 
Control  
(Behavior) 
Behavior 
unrestricted 
Behavior reduced by 
either physical or 
legal restrictions 
Behavior reduced 
by both physical 
and legal 
restrictions 
Control  
(Surveillance) 
No security 
personnel or 
CCTV present 
CCTV or one 
security guard 
present 
CCTVs and one or 
more security 
guards present 
Control 
(Access) 
No physical 
obstructions to 
access 
Few physical 
obstructions to 
access, but no 
entrances blocked 
Several physical 
obstructions to 
access and/or 
entrances that are 
blocked 
      
                    Figure 6: Access restriction            Figure 7: Behavioral control    
 
Figure 8: Surveillance measure 
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The classification criterion is a modified version of Nemeth’s (2010) zone level 
data table and aligns with Robert Sampson’s ecometric method of observing behavioral 
settings, especially at the neighborhood level.  Nemeth employs a simplified version of 
Flusty’s (1994) interdictory space classification system which only focuses on three 
typologies: access restrictions, behavioral controls, and surveillance measures.  Each 
zone is assessed on the following three criteria: one point will be received for any minor 
restriction and two points for any major restriction.  The total scores range from 0 to 6 
points.  The zones have been grouped into three categories based on an overall restriction 
level: low (0-2), moderate (3-4), or high (5-6).  For example, if a building were to be 
equipped with a CCTV camera and have a visible security guard the building would 
receive a score of 2 in the Surveillance category.  If the building were also to have 
signage warning of loitering and have no designated area for the public to converse (e.g. 
lack of city benches) the building would receive a score of 2.  If the same building were 
to have bollards surrounding the perimeter, the building would receive a score of 1 in the 
access category.  If the building were to have bollards as well as having only one access 
point to the building the score would be 2.  This scoring system allowed for comparisons 
of intensity across zones.  This researcher must acknowledge that certain criteria might 
have been weighted, or included additional measures or restrictions, however the 
simplicity of the tool allows for future replication of this methodology which could be 
used for future cross-sectional or longitudinal analyses. 
 Each city was observed over a period of several days at a time to collect cross-
sectional systematic social observation data on each security zone.  Each city’s central 
business district was observed over a course of several days to geotag the dimensions of 
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each security zone as well as ascertain and document the intensity of each security zone.  
While in the field a Casio Exilim H20G hybrid GPS digital camera was employed to 
define the boundaries of the security zone.  Observed data was collected with a notepad 
and later typed into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  Identifiable security zones were 
photographed with the GPS camera which was embedded with global positional data.   
The GPS camera was used to take a JPEG image that also contained metadata in 
the form of an Exchangeable image file format (EXIF).  The EXIF file contained latitude 
and longitude information which could be read by multiple software programs, including 
geographic information systems.  The geotagged photographs will then be uploaded into 
the geographic information systems program ArcGIS 10.1 and the geotagged photo will 
be encoded to ArcGIS.  High resolution photographs of each security zone will also be 
collected.  The security zone classification criteria will also be observed and coded for 
spatial analysis in ArcGIS.  The geotagged photographs will also be uploaded into 
ArcGIS to allow for the creation of security zone polygons which allow for the spatial 
calculation of the total area of each security zone polygon.  ArcGIS Explorer will be 
employed to help check for accuracy of the geotagged photos and measurements of the 
security zone polygons.   
Once the security zones have been identified within the ArcGIS program a spatial 
analysis of the data was conducted.  The spatial analyst tool of inverse distance weighted 
(IDW) interpolation within the ArcGIS program estimates the intensity of the security 
zones and neighboring space based on a known set of points.  The geotagged photos of 
security features construct a set of known data points for Chicago, Indianapolis, and 
Detroit.   
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IDW interpolation predicts a value for any unmeasured data point using values 
from measured data points.  This is done by calculating the set of known data points to 
unknown data points with a weighted average of the values available at the known data 
points.  IDW interpolation weights the points closer to the prediction location more than 
points farther away.  Therefore, measured data points will have more influence on 
predicted values closest to the known data point and diminish with distance.  The most 
accurate results from IDW interpolation are achieved when sampling is dense with 
measured data points from the sample area.  If the measured data points are sparse or 
uneven, the results may not accurately represent the surface area (Watson and Philip, 
1985).  IDW Interpolation is commonly used for sampling precipitation, temperature, 
evaluation, pollution sources, and mineral concentration.  This dissertation is the first 
time IDW interpolation is employed to measure the social phenomena of security zones.   
IDW interpolation provides the spatial variation of the intensity of a security 
surface for security zones/fortified space measures deployed to protect high value 
terrorist targets within the each city’s core.  ArcScene 10 was be used to provide highly 
detailed security zone 3D surfaces of the IDW interpolation maps.  This methodology can 
be easily replicated and will allow for future researchers to engage in cross-sectional or 
longitudinal analysis of Chicago, Indianapolis, Detroit or other cities.   
Once the mapping of the security zones has been accomplished, crime rates, 
office space rental rates, and population is compared from 2000 through 2010.  This 
comparison allows for a better understanding of the changes occurring within security 
zones.  The rates also are compared to similar rates outside of the security zone 
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boundaries.  This allows for a comparison of impacted areas to areas which are not 
generally associated with security zones or urban fortification in general.     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS 
Introduction 
 This study uses geotagging and spatial analysis to conceptualize and quantify 
security zones located within three major U.S. cities.  Over the course of several days, 
Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit were visited, and cross-sectional systematic social 
observations on security zones and their intensity were collected.  The sample area for 
each city was located within the central business districts of each city.  The intensity of 
each security zone was also coded and documented.  The dimensions of each security 
zone were geotagged using a Casio Exilim H20G hybrid GPS digital camera.  Observed 
data was collected with a notepad and later typed into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  
Identifiable security zones were also photographed with the GPS camera which was 
embedded with global positioning data.  High resolution photographs of each security 
zone were also collected.  The GPS camera took JPEG image of the security zone that 
contained metadata in the form of an Exchangeable image file format (EXIF).  The EXIF 
file contains latitude and longitude information which can be read by multiple software 
programs, including geographic information systems, for a precise location of the 
security zone. 
The geotagged photographs were uploaded into the geographic information 
systems program ArcGIS 10.1 and the geotagged photo, with the global positioning data, 
was encoded to ArcGIS.  Security zone classification criteria was also observed and 
coded for in Microsoft Excel.  The Excel spreadsheet was uploaded into ArcGIS as an 
attribute table for spatial analysis of each geotagged point.  The geotagged photographs 
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were also uploaded into ArcGIS to allow for the creation of security zone polygons.  
These photos allowed for the spatial creation and calculation of the total area of each 
security zone polygon.  ArcGIS Explorer, a companion program, was employed to cross 
reference accuracy of the geotagged photos and measurements of the security zone 
polygons.   
The spatial analyst tool of inverse distance weighted (IDW) interpolation, a 
feature of the ArcGIS program, was used to measure for the intensity of the security 
zones and neighboring space.  The geotagged photos of security features construct the set 
of known data points for Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit.  IDW interpolation predicts 
a value for any unmeasured data points using values from measured data points.  This is 
done by calculating the set of known data points to unknown data points with a weighted 
average of the values available at the known data points.   
IDW interpolation weights the points closer to the prediction location more than 
points farther away.  Therefore, measured data points will have more influence on 
predicted values closest to the known data point and diminish with distance.  IDW 
interpolation provides an observable intensity of a security surface for security zones 
space measures deployed to protect high value terrorist targets within each city’s core.  
ArcScene 10 was used to provide highly detailed security zone surfaces of the IDW 
interpolation maps.  
With the intensity and extent of the security zones identified, this study will then 
compare social and commercial activity within the identified central business districts to 
areas outside of the identified security zone areas.  The social and commercial activity 
data used for this study will be population rates, crime rates, and office space rental rates 
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from 2000 through 2010.  This will offer an explanation of security zone influences over 
commercial and social activities within security zones. 
Chicago 
The first site sampled was the City of Chicago.  As of 2011, Chicago is home to 
2,703,713 residents.  Chicago’s economy is mainly based on manufacturing, printing and 
publishing, finance, and food processing.  The city is also a major transportation and 
distribution center due to O’Hare International Airport and the Port of Chicago.  Chicago 
is also home to eleven Fortune 500 companies, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 
Chicago Board of Trade, a Federal Reserve Bank, and over 230 government agencies.      
Chicago is considered a Tier I city by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Urban Area Security Initiative list.  The area selected for this study was the central Loop.  
The central loop is located within Chicago’s designated Community Area 32, which is 
also known as the “Loop.” The Loop is the central business district for Chicago.  The 
name is derived from cable car tracks making a large circle through the middle of the 
city.  After experiencing rapid growth during the Civil War, the Fire of 1871 completely 
destroyed the Loop.  The fire cleared the way for skyscrapers and the reorientation of the 
business district from retail to commercial growth (Holt and Pacyga, 1979).  The number 
of people entering and leaving the Loop peaked at one million per day in the late 1940s 
and began to decline with suburban development and the increased use of the automobile 
(Holt and Pacyga, 1979).  Presently, the city government and business leaders have 
continued to produce a building boom to provide office space for corporations, 
government agencies, and banks.   
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The central loop contains the commercial center as well as all major governmental 
entities in the City of Chicago.  The boundaries of the central loop are West Wacker 
Drive and East Van Buren Street for north and south; and State Street and Wells Street 
for east and west.  The boundaries were taken from the City of Chicago’s official 
website.  The total population is 2,044 (IL Cook County - Census Tract 8391, Block 
Group 1).  The area being examined is 0.216 square miles; 138.463 acres; and 
6,031,486.895 square feet. 
The following buildings were observed to have a detectable security zone: 
Chicago Board of Trade, Ralph H. Metcalfe Federal Building, Everett M. Dirksen U.S. 
Courthouse, John C. Kluczynski Federal Building, Burling Bank, BMO Harris Bank, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, First American Bank, Chase Tower, McDonald's, 
BMO Harris Bank, Northern Trust Bank, 181 W. Madison, Fifth Third Bank, WBBM-
TV (CBS), Daley Civic Center, Cook County Building, 55. W. Wacker, and 205 W. 
Wacker.  The security features of each building were observed and cataloged.  The 
perimeter of each building and every security feature was geotagged for spatial 
calculation by ArcGIS. 
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Table 3: Observed data for Chicago 
 Table 3 describes the observed data for the central loop of Chicago.  The building 
column lists the name or addresses of the building exhibiting defensible space measures.  
X and Y contain the coordinate data of the defensible space measures on the Earth’s 
surface.  The X and Y coordinate data was collected by using a Casio Exilim H20G 
hybrid GPS digital camera.  Behavior, Surveillance, Access, and Total was the 
observable data that was collected.  Building Type serves as a brief description of the 
building.  The average score for buildings exhibiting security zone variables for the 
behavior criteria was 1.25.  Surveillance and access were 1.21 and 1.34, respectively.     
BUILDING X Y Behavior Surveillance Access Total Building Type
Lakeside Bank & Chase Bank -9755226.741 5142557.672 1 1 1 3 Bank
Chicago Board of Trade -9755125.692 5142563.439 2 2 1 5 CME Group
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Center (Offices) -9755014.329 5142562.831 1 1 1 3 CME Group Offices
77 W Jackson Blvd -9755001.143 5142562.804 1 1 2 4 Ralph H. Metcalfe Federal Building
77 W Jackson Blvd CCTV Camera -9754987.966 5142566.773 0 2 0 2 Ralph H. Metcalfe Federal Building
Security Booth (Dirksen Building) -9754758.797 5142760.967 0 2 2 4 Dirksen Fed Building
Everett M. Dirksen U.S. Courthouse (Jackson & Plmouth) -9754794.992 5142760.808 2 2 2 6 Dirksen Fed Building
Everett M. Dirksen U.S. Courthouse (Jackson & Dearborn) -9754842.776 5142759.855 2 2 2 6 Dirksen Fed Building
Federal Protective Service Officers -9754841.188 5142796.209 0 2 0 2 Dirksen Fed Building
John C. Kluczynski Federal Building (Jackson & Dearborn) -9754853.571 5142753.823 2 2 2 6 Kluczynski Fed Building
john C. Kluczynski Federal Building (Jackson & Federal) -9754906.911 5142753.823 2 2 2 6 Kluczynski Fed Building
Federal Protective Service Squad -9754983.852 5142737.207 0 2 0 2 Dirksen Fed Building
141 W Jackson Blvd -9755132.284 5142732.445 2 1 0 3 Burling Bank
BMO Harris Bank -9755219.464 5142730.725 0 1 1 2 Bank
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago -9755244.864 5142748.584 0 2 2 4 Fed Reserve Bank
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Truck Entrance -9755336.939 5142831.134 0 2 2 4 Fed Reserve Bank
First American Bank -9754821.794 5143123.632 0 1 0 1 Bank
Chase Tower (Monroe & Dearborn) -9754871.007 5143140.697 2 1 2 5 Bank Headquarters
Chase Tower (Monroe) -9754963.082 5143134.744 2 1 2 5 Bank Headquarters
McDonald's -9754999.198 5143140.697 1 0 1 2 Restaurant
BMO Harris Bank -9755138.501 5143111.725 0 1 1 2 Bank
Northern Trust Bank (Monroe & Wells) -9755334.558 5143132.363 1 1 1 3 Bank
Northern Trust Bank (Wells) -9755337.336 5143204.594 1 1 1 3 Bank
181 W. Madison -9755302.808 5143303.813 2 2 1 5 Office Building
Chase Tower (Madison) -9755004.357 5143308.973 2 1 2 5 Bank Headquarters
Fifth Third Bank -9754761.072 5143314.926 0 1 1 2 Bank
WBBM-TV (CBS) -9754855.529 5143522.757 0 0 1 1 T.V. Station
Daley Civic Center (Clark & Randolph) -9755019.042 5143677.803 1 2 2 5 City and County Building
Cook County Building (Sheriff, City Clerk, Ciy Council, etc.) -9755184.671 5143678.861 1 0 1 2 City and County Building
55. W. Wacker -9754953.213 5144040.494 1 1 1 3 Office Building
205 W. Wacker -9755323.895 5144026.207 0 1 0 1 Office Building
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Figure 9 displays all of the identified buildings exhibiting security zones in 
Chicago’s central Loop.    Each green box represents a building or cluster of buildings 
displaying security zone characteristics in Chicago’s central Loop.  When taking the 
square footage of the central Loop and dividing it by the square footage of fortified 
space; it was found that 22.6688% of the central Loop exhibited fortified space. 
   Several security zones stood out in the central Loop area.  The first two were the 
John Kluczynski Administrative Building and the Everett Dirksen Courthouse.  Both of 
these buildings are part of the Miles van der Rohe Chicago Federal Center.  The Metcalfe 
federal building and a U.S. post office are also located within the federal complex.  Both 
the Kluczynski and Dirksen buildings maxed out on the security zone criteria.  The 
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) utilizes a basic three layers of 
defense for site security.  The “layers of defense” is a cumulative protection strategy 
known as protection-in-depth and relies heavily on CPTED strategies for protecting and 
hardening assets behind several barriers (FEMA, 2011).  The Dirksen and Kluczynski 
federal buildings apply all three layers of defense. 
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Figure 9: Buildings exhibiting fortified space in Chicago 
The first layer of defense usually consists of natural or manmade barriers at the 
property line or sidewalk.  Both federal buildings have their perimeter surrounded with 
bollards, granite planters, and granite benches.  The bollard system was installed in 2002 
in response to increased security requirements for federal buildings.     
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Figure 10: Bollards surrounding Dirksen and Kluczynski federal buildings 
 
   Figure 11: Bollards and planters surrounding Dirksen and Kluczynski federal buildings 
 The second layer of defense extends from the perimeter of the site to the exterior 
side of a building.  Both federal buildings have public seating and crash rated planters 
within the plaza to provide inconspicuous barriers while allowing for public openness.  
FEMA (2007) stresses public buildings must employ perimeter barriers and streetscape 
enhancements while maintaining and augmenting the beautification of the public realm. 
90 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Public seating also serving as a barrier 
Another part of the second layer of defense is setbacks.  According to FEMA 
(2011), urban areas, particularly central business districts, are restricted in size because 
the availability of building space and high cost of property which impacts security 
designs.  Most buildings in this study had a zero setback, meaning the buildings start 
right on the property line.  This makes the building more susceptible to extensive damage 
from truck bombs containing chemical, biological, and radiological materials.  Both the 
Dirksen and Kluczynski federal buildings had significant setbacks from the city street. 
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Figure 13: The plaza provides additional standoff distance for the buildings 
Both the Dirksen and Kluczynski Federal Buildings had larges standoff distances.  
The plaza was originally designed to serve as public communal space for farmers markets 
and public gatherings (FEMA, 2007).  The plaza also allows for a more effective second 
layer of defense in an urban setting.   
The third layer of protection is the building itself.  Both the Dirksen and 
Kluczynski federal buildings utilize pilotis, i.e. ground level support columns, to provide 
further setback for  
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Figure 14: Pilotis surround each building 
potential attacks.  All of these access restrictions attributed to these buildings scoring 
high for the access variable.   
    
Figure 15: Federal law enforcement SUV                   
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Figure 16: Security Booth 
 
Figure 17: Armed patrols 
 The Dirksen and Kluczynski federal buildings also had multiple signage and 
surveillance measures in place.  A security booth with CCTV camera was located on the 
perimeter of the Dirksen federal building.  Several Department of Homeland Security 
Federal Protective Service officers were patrolling the grounds at all times.  Several of 
their sport utility vehicles were parked around the Dirksen, Kluczynski and Metcalfe 
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federal buildings.  All three federal buildings had numerous CCTV cameras around the 
perimeter of the buildings.  These factors lead to both the Dirksen and Kluczynski federal 
buildings to score high on the behavioral and surveillance variables as well.  The 
Metcalfe federal building scored just below the Dirksen and Kluczynski federal 
buildings.  For reference, the Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse houses 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, the U.S. Marshal Service, the 
Federal Public Defender, and the U.S. Probation Service.  Tenants of the John C. 
Kluczynski Federal Building include: the Department of State Passport Agency, 
Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, Drug Enforcement Agency, Air 
Force Recruiting Service, Office of Personnel Management, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, General Services Administration, and offices for both U.S. senators 
from Illinois.  
 
Figure 18: Reserve bank vehicle entrance            
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Figure 19: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
 The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago also stood out with an intense security zone 
protecting the building.  The building was surrounded with fixed bollards and crash rated 
planters.  The CCTVs were too numerous to count.  The main vehicle entrance had a 
rising wedge barrier accompanied by U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal 
Protective Service officers.  The building also had bars on all of the street level windows.  
On a side note, after taking several pictures of the building perimeter, a Federal 
Protective Service officer followed me for one city block and effectively chased me away 
from the building.   
 Another location that stood out was Chase Tower.  The building itself has an 
interesting curving feature.  The building has a wider base than at the top of the building.  
The building site also includes a multi-terraced plaza on its south side.  Although the 
Chase Tower plaza was designed for public openness and hosts a wide variety of public  
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            Figure 20: Curved building form                       Figure 21: Raised Planters 
 
Figure 22: Chase Tower plaza 
events, the plaza does exhibit a number of security zone features.  First and foremost the 
plaza provides a large setback distance for the building.  Raised planters surround the 
entire perimeter of the plaza as well.  The multi-leveled plaza does not allow any vehicle 
access to the southern side of the building.  The shallow fountain at the bottom of the 
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terrace is a perfect example of Boddy’s (2008) invisible security features.  Boddy (2008) 
describes these types of fountains as a passive aggressive design strategy; with the 
fountain quietly discouraging public assembly.  Planted trees, which can also be viewed 
as a type of physical barrier, surrounded the perimeter of the plaza.  On the north side of 
Chase Tower, there is zero setback from the street to the building.  Bollards have been 
installed, on the north side of the building and partially on the east and west side, to 
 
Figure 23: Bollards surrounding Chase Tower 
prevent ramming by a motor vehicle.  The north side also had several CCTV cameras 
positioned throughout the perimeter.   
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Next to Chase Tower was a McDonald’s.  At first glance there is nothing notable 
about the building.  However, on closer inspection the building did exhibit several 
security zone  
 
Figure 24: Defensible space features surrounding McDonald’s 
features.  The first was the difficulty in moving around the building.  There was only one 
entrance and exit point and the building was surrounded by a giant low-rise planter on the 
west side of the building and a five foot planter on the eastside.  This McDonald’s is a 
prime example of finding an appropriate balance between maintaining security while 
preserving the public realm beautification.  The balance was also identified and more 
prevalent Indianapolis’ Central Business District.      
The number of banks employing security zones within the central Loop was also 
of interest.  Burling Bank, Lakeside Bank, and two BMO Harris Bank’s all had common 
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security zone features like bollards, CCTV cameras, security guards, and numerous 
signage forbidding loitering and parking of vehicles.   
    
           Figure 25: BMO Harris Bank          Figure 26: Burling Bank 
    
        Figure 27: Another BMO Harris Bank         Figure 28: Lakeside Bank 
 An interesting note about Chicago was the staggering amount of CCTV cameras 
present in the central Loop.  The buildings that did have security zones in place almost all 
had numerous CCTV cameras surrounding their perimeter.  Further research found that 
Chicago has been actively installing CCTV cameras throughout the city for the purpose 
of terrorism prevention and crime control (Pastor, 2010).  Chicago’s Crime Prevention 
Information Center gathers intelligence from national, state, and local levels to deal with 
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terrorist activities.  A key component of the intelligence gathering is the CCTV camera 
network within the City of Chicago.  Interestingly enough, when there are lulls of 
terrorist activities, the extensive CCTV camera network is utilized to combat street crime.  
It was also found that Chicago is also instituting the Private Sector Video Domain 
(PSVD) program which allows Chicago’s Office of Emergency Management personnel 
to access private sector cameras to monitor for terrorist activities (Pastor, 2010).   
 
Figure 29: One of many CCTV cameras located in the central Loop 
However, in times where terrorism is not present the PSVD program is 
incorporated into Chicago police communications systems.  Pastor (2010) concludes 
federal, state, and local law enforcement officers have access to over 2,000 public and 
private CCTV cameras.  For example, in 2003 Chicago police were observing a 
suspiciously parked vehicle through a police observation device installed several weeks 
prior.  These observation devices are bulletproof and able to record a suspect from up to 
150 feet away.  While observing the suspect parked in his car the suspect began smoking 
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marijuana.  Shortly thereafter, members of Chicago’s Targeted Response Unit swarmed 
in and arrested the suspect for a felony drug charge (Main, 2003).     
 
Figure 30: Variation of Security Scores in the Central Loop (interpolated by IDW 
method) 
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 Figure 30 displays the IDW interpolation data of the behavioral, access, and 
surveillance variables in the central Loop of Chicago.   The dark green areas have no 
security zones present in that vicinity.  The dark green to light green areas displays no 
security zone or a low security zone presence.  The yellow and orange areas exhibit 
moderate security zones.  Light red and dark red indicate intense security zones present in 
that area.  The score was measured from definable security zone criteria.  The IDW 
interpolation map displays that the security zone influence is regional and does not limit 
itself to the perimeter of the building employing the security zone.  Both the Dirksen and 
Kluczynski federal buildings scored at the highest possible level and show up on the IDW 
interpolation map as red.  The plaza next to the Rohe Chicago Federal Center is displayed 
on the map as a single green dot next to the red and orange areas.  However, the 
surrounding security zones quickly diminish the openness and lack of a security zone 
within the plaza.  Other intense security zones in the central Loop included: the Chicago 
Board of Trade, the Daley Civic Center, and181 W. Madison Street (Paine Webber 
Tower).   
 Figure 31 provides an overlay of identified security zone areas with the IDW 
interpolation map.  When a person enters a security zone they will have their access 
restricted, behavior modified, or be surveilled.  The degree to which this happens is based 
on the intensity of the security zone.  The more intense the security zone, the more likely 
the person may feel the effects of the security zone.           
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Figure 31: IDW interpolation map with fortified space in the central Loop 
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Figure 32: Security surface of Chicago 
 Figure 32 is a thematic map created from raster data provided by the central Loop 
IDW interpolation map.  Raster data is a matrix of cells organized into rows and columns, 
where each cell contains a value representing information.  For this dataset the raster data 
are the security zone criteria.  This can be viewed as a temperature map for security zones 
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within the central Loop of Chicago.  The color ramp for this map is: green=low, 
yellow=moderate and red=high.  Simply put, the more red the map is, the more intense a 
security zone; the more green the map, the security zones becomes less to nonexistent.  
This image was accomplished by importing the IDW interpolation map into ArcScene, a 
three dimensional visualization application that allows for GIS raster data to be view in 
three dimensions. 
 
Figure 33: Topographical security surface of Chicago 
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 Figure 33 provides a topographical security surface of the central Loop in 
downtown Chicago.  The more intense areas are displayed as a raised red mound.  The 
lower the security zone, the area descends and becomes green.  This topographical map 
was accomplished by importing the IDW interpolation map into ArcScene.  ArcScene 
was used to provide a vertical exaggeration of the security surface.  Vertical exaggeration 
is typically used to emphasize subtle terrain differences.  However, the exaggeration was 
applied to the IDW interpolation map allowing for high and low scoring security zones to 
act as terrain and to represent a three dimensional surface map for display.   
The buildings that have been identified as using security zone criteria correlate 
with this topographical security surface map.  The security zone being generated by the 
Miles van der Rohe Chicago Federal Center can be seen at the lower right side of the 
map.  The three points in the vicinity of the Rohe Federal Center represent the 
Department of Homeland Security Federal Protective Officers, a security booth, and 
combination of bollards, planters, signage, and CCTV cameras surrounding a particular 
area. 
  Figure 34 has the buildings in Chicago’s central Loop superimposed onto a 3D 
prism map that was generated in ArcScene.  Rather than their real elevations, the 3D 
prism map displays the buildings total security score of the behavioral, access, and 
surveillance variables.   
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Figure 34: Central Loop 3D prism map with fortified buildings 
The buildings with less of a security presence have less height, while buildings 
that manifested high levels of security are taller.  The Dirksen and Kluczynski Federal 
Buildings are the tallest buildings on Figure 34.  The Metcalfe Federal Building, Chicago 
Board of Trade, Chase Tower, 181 W. Madison, and the Daley Civic Center also 
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registered as taller buildings.  WBBM-TV (CBS), 205 W. Wacker, and First American 
Bank only score a one on the security zone criteria and the elevation of those buildings 
reflect their low security score.       
 
Figure 35: Central Loop 3D prism map - alternate image 
Figure 35 reveals the central Loop security surface with the superimposed buildings at an 
alternate angle.  This angle provides a better view of the buildings exhibiting security 
zones in the central Loop.  Some buildings, such as 205 W. Wacker (located on the upper 
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left side of the map) and WBBM-TV CBS (located on the middle right side of the map) 
employed minimal security zones measures, but still register on the security surface map.   
Indianapolis 
 The second city that was analyzed was Indianapolis.  The Indianapolis economy 
is primarily focused on industrial, commercial, and transportation.  Tourism and sporting 
events are also major economic factors.  Indianapolis has aggressively quadrupled its 
sporting and tourism trade during the 1980s.  The 2011 population of Indianapolis is 
833,024.  The site chosen was Indianapolis’ central business district.  The Department of 
Homeland Security lists Indianapolis as a Tier II city.  Although Tier II cities are at less 
of a risk from a terrorist attack than Tier I cities, the Department of Homeland Security 
still provides the city with significant funding to combat potential terrorist strikes. 
Indianapolis’ central business district is located in downtown Indianapolis.  It did 
not become prominent until the Civil War.  During the war, the U.S. Army placed 24 
camps and an ammunition plant in Indianapolis.  The city became a major wartime 
location to launch campaigns against the Confederate States.  Indianapolis also 
experienced a post-war boom when business and industry reshaped the city.  The central 
business district, which also houses the Wholesale District, began to decline during the 
Great Depression.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the central business district was 
aggressively revitalized.  Aided by the creation of Unigov, the consolidation of city and 
county government, the central business district has seen the addition of over 100 new 
businesses and renovation projects since the mid 1990s (Discover Wholesale District, 
2013).   
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The boundaries of Indianapolis’ central business district are taken from the 
Indianapolis Regional Center Plan 2020 report.  The Indianapolis Regional Center Plan 
2020 was prepared by the City of Indianapolis, the Greater Indianapolis Progress 
Committee, Indianapolis Downtown INC., and Ball State University’s College of 
Architecture and Planning.  The boundaries are Michigan Street to Maryland Street for 
north and south; and North Delaware Street to Capitol Avenue for east and west.  The 
population of the sample area is 581 (IN - Marion County - Census Tract 3910, block 
group 3).  The area being examined is 0.228 square miles; 146.092 acres; and 
6,363,793.282 square feet.   
 
Table 4: Observed data for Indianapolis 
BUILDING X Y Behavior Surveillance Access Total Building Type
575 N. Pennsylvania St. -9590827.813 4833174.925 2 2 2 6 Minton-Capehart Federal Building: DEA, ICE, SSA, Dept. of VA, IRS, GSA
575 N. Pennsylvania St. -9590732.166 4833172.544 2 2 2 6 Minton-Capehart Federal Building (South Side)
1 Inidiana Square -9590725.763 4832571.859 2 0 1 3 Regions Bank Tower
1 Inidiana Square -9590839.005 4832575.034 2 0 1 3 Regions Bank Tower (Southwest Side)
200 E. Washington St. -9590647.446 4832236.367 2 2 1 5 Indianapolis City and County Building
141 E. Washington. St. -9590706.713 4832125.27 1 0 1 2 Riley Bennett & Egloff, LLP. (Law Firm)
45 North Pennsylvania Street -9590830.728 4832338.039 1 0 0 1 Huntington National Bank
107 North Pennsylvania Street -9590833.526 4832362.522 1 0 0 1 The National Bank of Indianapolis
46 East Ohio Street -9591040.528 4832672.234 1 2 2 5 U.S. District Court - Southern District Indiana (West)
46 East Ohio Street -9590959.169 4832574.338 1 2 2 5 U.S. District Court - Southern District Indiana (South)
46 East Ohio Street -9590949.247 4832741.688 1 2 2 5 U.S. District Court - Southern District Indiana (North)
46 East Ohio Street -9590868.549 4832662.312 1 2 2 5 U.S. District Court - Southern District Indiana (East)
220 N. Meridian St. -9591154.977 4832575.288 2 0 1 3 Indiana headquarters for AT&T (Southwest Side)
220 N. Meridian St. -9591065.945 4832572.113 2 0 1 3 Indiana headquarters for AT&T (Southeast Side)
111 Monument Circle -9590984.332 4832391.627 1 1 0 2 Chase Tower - Indiana headquarters for Chase Bank
111 Monument Circle -9590944.314 4832365.83 1 1 1 3 Chase Tower - Southern Side
1 South Capitol Ave. -9591301.401 4831964.524 1 0 1 2 Hyatt Regency Indianapolis - PNC Center
200 West Washington Street -9591486.174 4832364.27 2 0 0 2 Indiana Statehouse
201 N. Illinois Street -9591246.892 4832750.477 1 1 1 3 Capital Center North Tower 
1 American Square -9591279.105 4832584.88 1 1 0 2 OneAmerica Tower
1 American Square -9591447.645 4832590.701 1 0 1 2 OneAmerica Tower (Southwest Side)
1 American Square -9591276.724 4832744.689 1 0 1 2 OneAmerica Tower (Northeast Side)
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 Table 4 features the observable security criteria for Indianapolis’ central business 
district.  The only building receiving a maximum score for the security zone criteria was 
the Minton-Capehart Federal Building.  The averages for buildings exhibiting security 
zone criteria were as follows: behavior 0.95; surveillance 0.5; and access 0.5.   
 
Figure 36: Fortified buildings in Indianapolis’ Central Business District 
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Figure 36 displays the buildings with a detectable security zone.  Three buildings 
fell outside of the boundaries of the central business district, but were included in this 
study due to the close proximity of the border.  These are the Minton-Capehart Federal 
Building, Indiana Statehouse, and Indianapolis City and County Building.  The total 
square footage observed has been adjusted from 6,363,793.282 square feet to 
7,268,163.137 square feet to include the additional buildings.  An analysis of the square 
footage reveals that 25.2% of Indianapolis’ central business district displays some type of 
security zone.  The building that employed the most security zone features in 
Indianapolis’ central business district was the Minton-Capehart Federal Building.  
Maxing out on the security zone criteria, the Minton-Capehart Federal Building is a 
prime example of Brutalist architecture.   
 
Figure 37: Minton-Capehart Federal Building-West view 
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Brutalist architecture is mainly characterized by features such as the use of raw 
concrete, top-heavy massing, and the use of slender base supports (Whiteley, 2003).  The 
most notable features of the Minton-Capehart building are pilotis surrounding the entire 
building as well as the inverted ziggurat form.  In the late 1960s to the mid 1970s, 
defensive architecture was used frequently as a result of research which indicated a 
relationship between certain type of environmental design and reduced levels of violence 
(Coaffee, 2009).  The Minton-Capehart Federal Building, constructed in 1976, appears to 
be a product of defensive architecture.   
This building exhibited raised planters surrounding the west side of the building 
and half of the north and south side of the building.  The remaining north, south, and east 
perimeter of the building was protected with a ten foot high concrete wall which 
protected the employee parking lot.  The building and parking lot occupy the entire city 
block.  There is also a noticeable setback from the city street.  Due to the limited access 
points of the building and other defensible space features, a maximum score was giving 
for the access variable.  Two security booths and numerous CCTV cameras were present 
on the north and south side of the buildings perimeter.   
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   Figure 38: Minton-Capehart-South view     Figure 39: Minton-Capehart-Security wall 
 Figure 38 and 39 shows the concrete wall surrounding over half of the building.  
Department of Homeland Security Protective Service officers were also present 
throughout the perimeter of the building.  These factors contributed to the maximum 
scores of surveillance.  The building, which is open to the public, had few areas for the 
public to sit down and congregate.  The lack of public seating, benches and chairs, was 
noticeable.  It almost seemed as if the lack of seating was by design.  Perhaps building 
administrators do not want people loitering around the open spaces of the building.  This 
building received a maximum score in behavioral due to the lack of public openness.  
Tenants of the Minton-Capehart Federal Building include: General Services 
Administration, Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Drug 
Enforcement Agency.   
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    Figure 40: U.S. Courthouse-east view     Figure 41: U.S. Courthouse-southeastern view 
 Another federal building scoring high on the security zone criteria is the Birch 
Bayh Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse.  The building had an above average setback 
and was surrounded by large marble walls.  Several CCTV cameras were present on 
every side of the building.  The building had numerous access restrictions and only 
allowed for public gatherings in front of the building which has several benches.  The 
Birch Bayh Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse houses the U.S. District Court of 
Southern Indiana, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, U.S. Attorney office, U.S. Marshal Service, 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.   
          
     Figure 42: One American Square             Figure 43: Foliage surrounding One America 
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 One American Square (Figure 42 and 43) although scoring low on the security 
zone criteria, provides a great example of passive aggressive urban security design.  
Instead of using fixed bollards and crashed rated planters, the whole building is 
surrounded with a slope with strategically planted trees.  The trees seemed varied, but it 
was noticeable that a car would not be able to drive past the tree barriers.  The vegetation 
also acts as bollards and provides a noticeable setback from the sidewalk.  Pleasant 
vegetation aside, One American Square did still have CCTVs and had no seating or 
congregating points for pedestrians.  The perimeter appears to be designed to keep 
pedestrian traffic moving and prevent loitering.  According to Boddy (2008), One 
American Square’s passive aggressive security design will be the norm for future central 
business district buildings.         
 
Figure 44: PNC Center 
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 The Hyatt Regency Indianapolis/PNC Center, Figure 44, is another building 
exhibiting a low level security zone.  However, there are some interesting features worth 
noting.  The PNC center is a mixed use building which houses the 500 room Hyatt 
Regency as well as commercial offices.  The building has defensive foliage and crash 
rated planters surrounding the building.  The building has a large setback on its southern 
side.  The PNC Center was the only hotel in this study to display a security zone. 
 Figure 45 is the IDW interpolation map of the central business for Indianapolis.  
The most noticeable results are the extreme values being generated by the Minton-
Capehart federal building in the upper right corner of the map.  The security zone is 
extending far beyond the perimeter of the building.  A possible reason for this outlier is  
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Figure 45: Variation of Security Scores in Downtown Indianapolis (interpolated by IDW 
method) 
the lack of sampled data points that were used to interpolate the Minton-Capehart Federal 
Building’s security surface.  There may not be enough sampled points to accurately 
predict the extent of the security zone.  Extending the sample area far beyond the central 
business district will provide a more accurate representation of the Minton-Capehart and 
confirm that the initial sample is an outlier.  The U.S. District Courthouse also shares an 
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intense security zone which can be seen underneath the Minton-Capehart security zone.  
The final security zone registering a high value was the Indianapolis City and County 
Building located on the lower right side of the IDW interpolation map.    
 
Figure 46: IDW interpolation map with fortified space for Indianapolis 
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 Figure 46 provides the perimeter of the buildings with security zones in effect.  
Again the most significant finding in this IDW interpolation map is the Minton-Capehart 
security zone outlier extending far beyond the physical location of the building.   
 
 
Figure 47: Security surface of Indianapolis 
 Figure 47 is a thematic map of security zones within Indianapolis’ central 
business district.  This security surface provides a better representation of the security 
zone being generated by the Minton-Capehart Federal Buildings as well as the Birch 
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Bayh Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse.  The Minton-Capehart security zone extends 
several blocks from the buildings origination point.  The map provides a sense of the 
severe intensity of the security zone.  The majority of the central business district 
exhibited little to no security zones.     
 
Figure 48: Topographical security surface of Indianapolis 
 Figure 48 presents a three dimensional security surface of the central business 
district of Indianapolis.   The more intense areas are displayed as a raised red mound.  
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The lower the security zone, the area descends and becomes green.  The main buildings 
with intense security  
 
Figure 49: Indianapolis security surface with defensible space buildings 
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zones were the Minton-Capehart Federal Building, Birch Bayh U.S. Courthouse and the 
Indianapolis City and County Building.  For Indianapolis, the only buildings that have 
very high security zones are government entities.    
 
 Figure 50: Indianapolis security surface with defensible space buildings-alternate image 
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Figure 49 has the thematic map superimposed with the intensity level that each 
building displayed for the observable security zone criteria.  With the Minton-Capehart 
Federal Building  
appearing on the thematic map its, security zone is so intense that it extends into other 
security zones several blocks away.  Compare the Minton-Capehart security zone, which 
had a total value of six, to the security zone being generated by the Indianapolis City and 
County Building, with a total value of five.  The City and County Building’s security 
zone does not extend outward for several city blocks like the Minton-Capehart building.  
The thematic map being generated by ArcScene concludes the security features being 
used by the Minton-Capehart building are much more extreme than any other detectable 
security zone.  Figure 50 provides a better comparison of security zones between the 
massive Minton-Capehart building and the City and County building.    
Detroit 
 Detroit’s economy is primarily based upon the automotive industry.  With the 
decline of the automotive manufacturing, the city lost 39% of manufacturing jobs in the 
1980s.  The automotive supply industry is also a huge economic factor in Detroit.  
General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and Daimler AG (formerly Chrysler) 
are all headquartered in Detroit.  Detroit is the 18
th
 most populated city in the U.S. and 
the population has been steadily declining for over 60 years.  The population of Detroit 
during 1950 was 1,849,569; in 1980 it is 1,203,339; 2000 was 951,270; to its 2011 
population of 713,239.  Detroit is currently operating on a $300 million budget deficit 
and is in the process of having the state of Michigan appoint a manager to manage 
Detroit’s financial woes.  In 2011, Detroit ranked third in murder only behind New York 
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and Chicago.  The population of the sample area is 303 (MI - Wayne County - Census 
Tract 5172, Block Group 1 and Census Tract 5172, Block Group 1).      
Detroit is considered a Tier II city by the Department of Homeland Security.  The 
boundaries were defined from the National Register of Historic Places listing in 
Downtown and Midtown Detroit.  The boundaries are Michigan Avenue and Monroe 
Street for north and Jefferson Avenue for south.  Randolph Street and Washington 
Boulevard are the boundaries for east and west.  The area for Downtown Detroit is 0.101 
square miles; 65.062 acres; and 2,834,124.051 square feet. 
 Detroit was originally a trading post for Native American tribes.  During the Civil 
War, Detroit was the final stop of the Underground Railroad.  In 1896, Detroit became 
the Motor City of the world with Henry Ford’s inception of the assembly line.  Detroit’s 
manufacturing success continued through post World War II.  With the decline of the 
U.S. automotive industry Detroit has suffered the most with white flight and increased 
crime rates.  However, the city is actively engaged in multiple revitalization projects.   
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Table 5: Observed data for Detroit 
 Although Downtown Detroit is much smaller than the areas studied in Chicago 
and Indianapolis, there were still a number of buildings employing security zones and 
defensible space measures.  The averages for buildings exhibiting security zone criteria 
score in Downtown Detroit were as follows: behavior 0.73; surveillance 1.33; and access 
1.06.  Unlike Chicago and Indianapolis, no buildings observed maxed out on the total 
security zone criteria.  The former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Detroit Branch, 1 
Woodward Avenue, and the Coleman A. Young Municipal Center scored the highest on 
the security zone criteria.   
One interesting note about Downtown Detroit was the noticeable multiple signage 
indicating a central business district neighborhood watch program.  Further research 
found that the Detroit Police Department and more than 30 businesses in Downtown 
BUILDING X Y Behavior Surveillance Access Total Building Type
2 Woodward Avenue -9244388.446 5210530.364 1 2 1 5 Coleman A. Young Municipal Center (City Hall)
600 Randolph Street -9244323.358 5210825.64 2 1 1 4 Former Wayne County Building (Wayne Co. Courthouse)
611 Woodward Avenue -9244663.428 5210597.092 1 1 1 3 The Qube (Formerly Chase Tower/Quickens Loans office building)
511 Woodward Avenue -9244606.807 5210496.815 1 1 2 4 MFS Intelenet Inc. (Communication company)
1 Woodward Avenue -9244558.706 5210343.568 1 2 1 5 Class A Office Center
535 Griswold Street -9244714.228 5210487.555 0 2 0 2 Buhl Building (Class A Office Center)
719 Griswold Street -9244842.657 5210672.075 0 1 0 1 Class A Office Center
231 West Lafayette Boulevard -9245037.92 5210590.054 1 2 1 4 Theodore Levin U.S. Courthouse
160 W. Fort Street -9244925.207 5210621.275 1 2 2 5 Office Space (Former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Detroit Branch Building)
625 Shelby Street -9244908.549 5210465.996 0 1 1 2 Elysium Lounge (Night club)
205 West Congress -9244870.661 5210404.19 0 1 2 3 Bankers Trust Company Building
2 Washington Blvd -9244834.254 5210227.659 1 0 1 2 Detroit Riverside Hotel (Closed)
250 W. Larned Street -9244898.812 5210272.321 1 1 2 4 City of Detroit Fire Department
211 West Fort Street -9245017.346 5210489.703 1 2 1 4 Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of MI, U.S. Border Patrol HQ and US Attorneys office.
500 Griswold Street -9244687.24 5210497.873 0 1 0 1 Guardian Building (Wayne County Government Center)
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Detroit participate in a central business district neighborhood watch and patrol program 
called “Project Lighthouse.” The neighborhood watch program, created in August 2011, 
is designed to provide a safe environment for residents, employees, and visitors in the 
Downtown Detroit area.     
 
Figure 51: Project Lighthouse: CBD neighborhood watch program 
 The program provides information, aid, shelter, and safety for citizens in need of 
assistance.  Every participant, known as a lighthouse, has security personnel available 24 
hours a day, seven days a week to assist citizens in need.  The overall mission of Project 
Lighthouse is to promote the safety and security of Downtown Detroit while augmenting 
the Detroit Police Department’s presence in the central business district.  Project 
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Lighthouse is a prime example of blending public and private entities and interests; and 
coordinating their efforts to provide urban security for Detroit’s central business district.  
Three project lighthouse buildings fell within boundaries of this research project.  Two of 
the three buildings, The Qube (611 Woodward Avenue) and The Dime Building (719 
Griswold Street), exhibited measurable defensible space measures.  The third building, 
First National Building (660 Woodward Avenue) had no detectable security zone 
features. 
 
Figure 52: Fortified buildings in Downtown Detroit 
 Figure 52 displays the buildings identified in Downtown Detroit that exhibited 
some form of a security zone.  One Building, the former Wayne County Building, did fall 
outside of the boundaries of Downtown Detroit.  However, the building was included in 
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this study due to the close proximity of the border.  The total square footage observed has 
been adjusted from 2,834,124.051 square feet to 2,936,222.287 square feet to include the 
additional building.  An analysis of the square footage reveals that 26.7858% of 
Downtown Detroit exhibits some form of security zone.  The security zones that stood 
out were the Coleman A. Young Municipal Center, 611 Woodward Avenue, 511 
Woodward Avenue, and the former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Detroit Division.  
The majority of buildings that had security zones were located on the western side of 
Downtown Detroit.     
        
        Figure 53: Municipal Center   Figure 54: Spirit of Detroit 
 The Coleman A. Young Municipal Center contains the primary governmental 
offices for the city of Detroit.  The building had a large setback and many crash rated 
planters throughout the perimeter of the building.  All of the trash receptacles for the 
building were located as far from the building site as possible.  This can be explained as a 
mitigation measure to reduce the likelihood of a bomb being placed in the trash 
receptacle (FEMA, 2007).  The intensity of these security zones features were noticeably 
less than other government buildings in Chicago and Indianapolis.  The security design 
layout seemed to employ many of Boddy’s (2008) passive aggressive security design 
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features.  Another passive aggressive feature is the statue “Spirit of Detroit,” which is 
located on the eastern side of the municipal center.  The statue provides additional 
setback and acts as a cleverly disguised barrier.   
    
              Figure 55: The Qube    Figure 56: Barrier free sign 
 The Qube, which is located at 611 Woodward Avenue, is a 14 floor office 
building located in the heart of Downtown Detroit.  The Qube is currently the 
headquarters for Quicken Loans and was previously named Chase Tower.  There were 
numerous access restrictions for the west, east and part of the south side of the building.  
The building appears to be built on a slope and the base of the building was lifted 
approximately eight feet high to be even with the northern side of the building.  This 
build up of three-fourths of the building gives the building a fortress like appearance.  
The barrier free entrance on Fort Street had a significant setback from the street. The 
building also had a water drainage area on Fort Street, but was raised up two feet and 
acted as if it were a large bollard.  The building had one CCTV camera and no patrolling 
security guards.  Overall, the building was observed as having a moderate security zone.        
 
131 
 
 
 
    
Figure 57: Former Federal Reserve Bank  
 
Figure 58: Planters in front building 
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The next building of interest was the former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago-
Detroit Branch building.  The building was occupied by the Federal Reserve Bank until 
2004.  The building was vacant until 2011 when it was purchased by Quicken Loans for 
additional office space.  The building is surrounded with crash rated planters and 
additional planters to provide further setback.  CCTV cameras were also placed at the 
entrance of the building.  This building received a five for the security zone criteria. 
 
Figure 59: 511 Woodward Avenue  
 One other interesting building exhibiting a number of security zone features was 
511 Woodward Avenue.  The building has an above average setback and is completely 
surrounded by massive bollards.  There was no place for public seating and only one 
entrance hidden away on the side of the building.  There appeared to be an entrance in the 
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front of the building, but looks as if it had been barricaded shut.  The building is 
unmarked and CCTV cameras were also present around the building.  511 Woodward 
Avenue’s tenant is MFS Intelenet Inc., a provider of communications services for 
businesses and government agencies.   
 
Figure 60: Variation of Security Scores in Downtown Detroit (interpolated by IDW 
method) 
 Figure 60 display the IDW interpolation results for Downtown Detroit.  The 
buildings projecting intense security zones include the Coleman A. Young Municipal 
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Center, 160 W. Fort St. (former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago-Detroit Branch), and 
the 1 Woodward Ave. (Michigan Consolidated Gas Building).   
 
Figure 61: IDW interpolation map with buildings for Downtown Detroit 
 The Colman Center security zone, located on the lower right side in Figure 61, 
does extend past its building perimeter.  However, a portion of that area is considered 
setback from the building.  The remaining security zone overflow affects a public parking 
garage across the street from the Coleman Center.  The Michigan Consolidated Gas 
Building, located in the lower middle portion of the map, had an intense security zone 
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which only surrounded the main entrances of the building.  The former Federal Reserve 
Bank also had an intense security zone which was only found at is main entrance.   
 
 
Figure 62: 3D prism map of Downtown Detroit 
 Figure 62 displays a 3D prism map of the security surface for Downtown Detroit.  
The most intense security zones include: the Coleman municipal center can be seen in the 
lower right side of the map; the Michigan Consolidated Gas Building security zone is 
located in the lower middle section of the map; and the former Federal Reserve Bank 
located in the left side of the map.   
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Figure 63: Topographical security surface of Detroit 
Figure 63 provides a topographical map of Downtown Detroit’s security surface.  
Downtown Detroit did not present any buildings that had the maximum security zone 
criteria.  Therefore, the topography for Downtown Detroit is not as pronounced as 
Chicago and Indianapolis.        
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Figure 64: Detroit security surface with fortified buildings 
 The majority of buildings displaying security zone were located on the western 
side of the observed area.  The largest security zone, the Colman Municipal Center, can 
be seen in the lower right corner of the map.      
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Figure 65: Downtown Detroit security surface - alternate image 
 Figure 65 provides an alternative angle of Downtown Detroit’s security zones 
with the buildings superimposed onto the map. 
Summary and Discussion 
 Of all the federal building observed in this study, the Minton-Capehart Federal 
Building had the most extreme security zone.  As stated before, the Minton-Capehart 
security zone could could be an outlier and further data points would need to be sampled 
for a better approximation of the security field.  The security zone extended much farther 
than the security zones of the similarly scored Kluczynski and Dirksen Federal Buildings 
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in Chicago.  The Minton-Capehart building, originally constructed in 1976, has a 
Brutalist architecture design which resembles a fortress like appearance.  While the 
Kluczynski, Dirksen, and Metcalfe Federal Buildings in Chicago have been retrofitted 
with security zones in the wake of the September 11
th
 attacks, the Minton-Capehart 
building has been designed, intentionally or unintentionally, to restrict pedestrian 
movement, limit access points for citizens, and provide maximum standoff distance in 
case of a truck bomb.   
 The most frequently observed behavioral variable throughout this study was 
prohibitive signage.  These signs mainly prohibited public loitering in certain areas of the 
building.  For surveillance the CCTV camera was the most observed.  FEMA (2011) 
recommends the use of CCTV cameras as a low case and moderately effective means to 
deter criminal activity.  The bollard and crash rated planter were the most observed 
access restriction.  These defensive measures provide the greatest amount of protection to 
the building and its inhabitants (FEMA, 2011).    
 Of the three districts observed, Chicago’s central loop had the most security zones 
present.  Seventeen buildings in the central Loop exhibited a security zone.  Detroit and 
Indianapolis had fifteen and thirteen buildings, respectively.  Although the sample area 
was less than half that of Chicago and Indianapolis, Detroit had more buildings than 
Indianapolis exhibiting security zones and two less than Chicago.  Detroit and 
Indianapolis both had significant areas that did not have a security zone present.  Taking 
into account the possible outlier of Indianapolis’ Minton-Capehart Federal Building, 
Indianapolis’ central business district had the least amounts of security zones present.  
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Chicago’s security surface, which frequently had more security zones present, did not 
have as many gaps as the other cities had present.       
Even with the constant threat of another terrorist attack and U.S. cities adding 
urban fortifications, of the observed cities, roughly three quarters of urban public space 
appear to be free of security zones.  Further research will be needed on other cities within 
the U.S., but the pervasiveness of security zones appears to be primarily focused on 
public buildings and private banks.  The majority of security zone research has focused 
on major global cities like New York and London, both of which have experienced 
catastrophic terrorist attacks.  In the case of London, they have been experiencing 
terrorist attacks since the 1970s.  Future studies should include cities that have 
experienced a terrorist attack such as Oklahoma City and New York to compare the level 
of security zones with cities that have not experienced such attacks.         
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CHAPTER SIX 
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS 
Introduction 
This spatial analysis looked at three uniquely different cities.  By adapting the 
observable security zone criteria and imputing the data into ArcGIS and ArcScene, this 
study has been able to display a phenomenon of public and private fortification of space 
that is present in Downtown Detroit, Indianapolis’ central business district, and 
Chicago’s central Loop.  Each city varied widely in population density, overall size, and 
economy.  Each city also received a wide variance of federal funding from the 
Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Areas Security Initiative.  The averages of 
behavior, surveillance, and access scores of Chicago, Indianapolis and Detroit are 
presented in Table 6.   
                 ___________________________________________________________ 
   Table 6.  Security Zone Averages (Tier I vs. Tier II) 
                 ___________________________________________________________ 
                             City                 Behavior Average   Surveillance Average     Access Average 
Chicago  
(Tier I) 
1.25 1.21 1.34 
Indianapolis  
(Tier II) 
0.95 0.50 0.50 
Detroit  
(Tier II) 
0.73 1.33 1.06 
Tier II 
Averages 
0.84 0.915 0.78 
Tier I vs. Tier II 
 Mean 
Differences 
0.41 0.295 0.56 
 
The behavior average score for Chicago was 1.25, however the average scores of 
the Tier II cites (Indianapolis and Detroit) are only 0.84, a difference of 0.41.  The 
surveillance average of Chicago was 1.21 with the Tier II averages at 0.915 a difference 
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of 0.295.  Access averages had an average of 1.34 for Chicago and 0.78 for the Tier II 
cities a difference of 0.56.  In other words, the Tier I classification by the Department of 
Homeland Security for the city of Chicago is supported by the security zone averages 
presented in Table 6.   
To confirm the statistical significance of the averages in Table 6, a one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical test was conducted.  ANOVA allows for 
determining the statistical  
    _________________________________________________________________ 
 Table 7.  ANOVA Results of Security Zone Averages 
    _________________________________________________________________ 
  Variance Source    Sum of Squares    Degrees of Freedom      Mean Squares 
Between 
Groups 
0.5838 2 0.2919 
Within 
Groups 
0.3245 6 5.4078E-02 
Total 0.9082 8 N/A 
    F-Value = 5.397 
   Critical F-Value = 4.46 
significance of three or more sample means simultaneously (Vito and Latessa, 1989).  
The null hypothesis for this test is that the mean is the same for all observed groups.  The 
alternate hypothesis is that the average is not the same for all groups.  The F-
Value/Statistic for this sample is 5.397.  The F-Value exceeds the minimum critical value 
of 4.46 with two degrees of freedom at 0.05 significance; the null hypothesis is rejected.  
With the null hypothesis rejected, these averages are statistically significant and at least 
two groups averages are different from each other in this sample.           
Detroit does have a higher surveillance average than the Tier I city of Chicago.  A 
feasible explanation to the higher surveillance scores are Detroit’s high crime rates.  
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2011 Uniform Crime Report, Detroit 
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does have the highest per capita violent crime rate of the three cities studied.  Project 
Lighthouse was implemented to augment the Detroit Police Department in response to 
Detroit’s crime rate.  The majority of Detroit’s surveillance score was generative from 
CCTV cameras.  FEMA’s Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings lists CCTV cameras as a cost effective measure for general crime 
deterrence.  Therefore, Detroit’s high surveillance scores may be in response to an overall 
high violent and property crime rate which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The security zone building scores were also noticeably different from city to city.  
Of the three security zone criteria, Chicago’s highest average ranked security zone 
variable was for access restriction, whereas Indianapolis was behavior and Detroit’s was 
surveillance.  According to FEMA’s mitigation manual, the most expensive security 
measure to combat urban terrorism is access restrictions.  Chicago has received the most 
funding from the Urban Areas Security Initiative therefore; Chicago is able to afford 
more costly anti-terrorism measures like access restrictions.  Surveillance appears to be 
the chief concern of Downtown Detroit with its central business district neighborhood 
watch program, Project Lighthouse, and the afore mentioned cost effectiveness of CCTV 
cameras.  Indianapolis, have the lowest funding and crime rates, appears to be using 
effective behavioral security measures in its central business district.          
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____________________________________________ 
   Table 8.  Average Security Zone Building Scores 
          Public vs. Private Buildings 
(Tier I vs. Tier II) 
____________________________________________ 
                                           City                  Average Public  Average Private 
          Building Security      Building Security 
                                                                                  Score                          Score 
Chicago  
(Tier I) 
4.6 2.83 
Indianapolis  
(Tier II) 
4.5 2.22 
Detroit  
(Tier II) 
3.6 3.1 
Tier II 
Means 
4.23 2.71 
Tier I vs. Tier II 
Differences 
0.55 0.17 
 
As table 8 indicates, publicly owned buildings, which are either managed by city, 
county or federal officials, all had higher security zone building scores when compared to 
privately owned buildings, regardless of Tier level.  The higher building score leads to a 
more intense security zone surrounding the building in question.  While Chicago has the 
overall highest security zone for public spaces, followed closely by Indianapolis, Detroit 
did have the highest average building score for privately owned buildings, exceeding 
Chicago’s score by 0.27.  Private building owners in Detroit may be fortifying their 
businesses in response to high crime rates.    
 
 
 
 
 
145 
 
 
Table 9. Independent Group T-Test Analysis 
Group Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Average Public  
Building Security 
Score 
3 4.233334 0.5507537 
Average Private 
Building Security 
Score 
3 2.1716666 0.4508144 
 
T-Statistic = 3.690916 
Degrees of Freedom = 4 
Critical Value (One-Tail at 0.05) = 2.132 
Critical Value (Two-Tail at 0.05) = 2.776 
 
The result of a T-Test for statistically significant differences in mean building 
security scores is presented in Table 9.  The findings indicate that there is a statistically 
significant mean difference in the average public building security scores and the average 
of private building security scores.  The T-Statistic of 3.690916 is larger than the 
minimum critical value of 2.776.  The null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted.  It can be stated that public building security score averages are 
higher than private building security scores sampled in this study.  The difference in 
means shows that public building security scores, on average, score 1.5 more points than 
private buildings in this study.  The chance that sampling error explains this difference in 
the averages is less than 5 in 100 chances.         
    However, it is interesting to note that of all the city districts studied in this 
analysis, approximately 25% of each area exhibited some form of security zone as seen in 
Table 10.  The central Loop in Chicago was found to have 22.6% of its area with some 
type of security zone in place.  Indianapolis and Detroit had 25.2% and 26.7%, 
respectively.  The average area of the three central business districts to employ some type 
of security zone is 24.8%.  These percentages were calculated from taking the total 
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square feet of the sample area and subtracting the square feet of observed fortified space 
and dividing the difference.  These percentages are interesting when also comparing the 
amount of federal dollars spent per each city. 
____________________________________________ 
Table 10.  Percentage of Security Zone Landscape  
in Observed Sample Area 
____________________________________________ 
                                                         City              Security Zone % 
Chicago  
(Tier I) 
22.6 
Indianapolis  
(Tier II) 
25.2 
Detroit  
(Tier II) 
26.7 
 
Tier II 
Averages 
26.0 
Tier I vs. Tier II 
Differences 
-3.3 
  
Chicago, a Tier I city on the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Areas 
Security Initiative, was awarded $477,545,542 from 2002 to 2012 to specifically combat 
terrorist activities.  The Tier II city of Detroit, secured $132,614,497, and had the highest 
percentage of security zones.  Indianapolis, also a Tier II city, secured the lowest amount 
of federal funding of the three cities observed, at $50,774,706, which was the most 
economical.  The overall area studied in Indianapolis was slightly larger than the central 
Loop, and 25.2% of Indianapolis’ central business district had a detectable security zone 
compared to 22.6% for the central Loop.    
 Buildings housing government entities and financial institutions were the most 
likely to have a security zone in the surrounding area.  Office buildings, universities, and 
businesses typically did not have security zones in their general vicinity.  Security zones 
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of government entities, in all three cities, scored the highest for the security zone criteria.  
The most common type of security zone criteria present for government entities are 
surveillance and access restrictions.           
Changes in Demographic, Economic, and Social Activities in Security Zones 
 In order to have a better understanding of demographic changes, as well as 
changes in economic and social activity occurring within the Tier I and Tier II security 
zones, population changes, crimes rates, and commercial office rental rates were 
examined.  All activity was examined over a ten year period, with a focus from pre-9/11 
to present.  Although it has been established security zones were present prior to 
September 11
th 
2001, the terrorist attacks on that day amplified the presence of security 
zones within U.S. cities (Coaffee, O’Hare and Hawkesworth, 2009).  Therefore, this 
paper focused on pre-9/11 to present day social and commercial activities occurring 
within security zones.   
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_________________________________________________________ 
Table 11. Population Changes 
_________________________________________________________ 
                 2000                 2010                 Percent Change 
City of Chicago 
Population 
2,896,046 2,695,598 -6.9%  
Central Loop 
(Chicago) 
Population Rates 
893 2,044 +128.8%  
City of 
Indianapolis 
Population 
781,870 820,445 +4.9%  
Downtown 
Indianapolis 
Population Rates 
342 581 +69.8%  
City of Detroit 
Population 
           951,270 
  
713,777 -24.9%  
Downtown 
Detroit 
Population Rates 
379 303 -20%  
(U.S. Census Data) 
 
  Population change within security zones was compared to the overall population 
change of the city examined.  Both Chicago’s and Indianapolis’ central business districts 
have had an increase in population over the past ten years.  The city of Chicago lost 
200,418 residents from 2000 to 2010.  However, Chicago’s central Loop experienced an 
increase of 1,151 residents; up 128% from 2000 to 2010.  The city of Indianapolis was 
the only city in the study that had an overall increase in total population.  Indianapolis 
added 38,585 residents, an increase of 4.9%.  Downtown Indianapolis experienced a 
69.8% increase in residents from 2000 to 2010.  The city of Detroit experienced an 
overall loss of 237,493 residents for a 24.9% decrease in total population from 2000 to 
2010.  The central business district in Detroit had a smaller population decrease of 20%.  
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While Detroit’s downtown population decline aligns with U.S. census data for the entire 
city, Downtown Detroit did not experience as high as a population decline as the overall 
city.  Therefore, the population data suggest that the security zones of all three cities 
experienced population changes that differed from the overall population patterns 
between 2000 and 2010, and these changes tended to be population increases for the 
areas inside security zones and decreases outside of the zones.  This suggests that security 
zones may have had a positive impact on the residential patterns within them.  However, 
further research must be conducted to exclude spurious relationships.   
Social Activity 
Morenoff, Sampson, and Roudenbush (2001) conducted a neighborhood level 
study on homicide rates within the city of Chicago.  They found that concentrated 
disadvantage and low levels of social control within neighborhoods were accurate 
predictors of homicide rates.  However, they also noted that a neighborhoods’ spatial 
proximity to homicide risk was also strongly associated with variations in homicide rates.  
This study compared crimes rates within and outside of the previously established 
security zones to further assess the affect of levels of social control on social activities.  
Crime data consisted of crimes against persons and crimes against property.  Crimes 
against persons include: robbery, battery, assault, homicide, and criminal sexual assault.  
Crimes against property are comprised of: theft, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and arson. 
 Crimes against persons and property from 2001 through 2011 were compared 
within Chicago’s Loop.  The city of Chicago Police Department did not start to collect 
and archive specific spatial crime data until 2001.  It was found that crimes against 
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persons increased by 7.8% through the ten year period.  Crime against property 
experienced a larger decrease of 42.9%.  
_________________________________________________________ 
Table 12.  Central Loop and 
Neighboring Community Areas Crime Rates 
_________________________________________________________ 
                                                    2001                             2011                Percent Change 
Central Loop 
crimes against 
person 
114 123 +7.8 
Central Loop 
crimes against 
property 
2,586 1,475 -42.9 
Near West Side 
crimes against 
persons 
487 237 -51.3%  
Near West Side 
crimes against 
property 
1,952 1,644 -15.7%  
Near South Side 
crimes against 
persons 
90 29 -67.7%  
Near South Side 
crimes against 
property 
475 316 -33.4%  
Near North Side 
crimes against 
persons 
367 237 -35.4%  
Near North Side 
crimes against 
property 
3,109 1,989 -36%  
(City of Chicago Data Portal) 
 
The Near West Side, which contains the University of Illinois-Chicago, United 
Center, and several hospitals, is located directly west from the Loop.  From 2001 to 2011, 
the Near West Side saw a 51.3% decrease of crimes against persons.  Crimes against 
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property decreased a modest 15.7%.  The Near South Side is located just south the Loop.  
The Near South Side contains Soldier Field, McCormick Place, and the Museum 
Campus.  This community area saw a 67.7% decrease of crimes against persons, and a 
33.4% decrease in crimes against property.  The Near North Side, located just north of 
the Loop, is home to Navy Pier, the Magnificent Mile, and the Gold Coast.  Located just 
north of the Loop, the Near North Side is considered to be an affluent community.  This 
area saw a 35.4% decrease in crimes against persons, and a 36% decrease of crimes 
against property. 
In 2011, the Bureau of Justice Statistics National Crime Victimization Survey 
reported that between 2001 and 2010, the U.S. experienced an average decrease in crimes 
against persons of 33.5 percent.  When comparing all three neighboring community areas 
to the Loop, there was a 51.4% decrease in crimes against persons from 2001 to 2011, 
while the Loop saw a 7.8% increase in crimes against persons for the same time period.  
The National Crime Victimization Survey also found from 2001 to 2010, there was a 
19.2% decrease in the national average for crimes against property.  The three 
neighboring community areas had a 28.3% decrease in crimes against property, while the 
Loop saw a 43% decrease in crimes against property.  Therefore, the increase in crimes 
against persons for the Chicago security zone is surprising in light of the strong contrary 
trends in the surrounding areas and the large decrease for property crimes in the security 
zone. 
The next set of data examined was Downtown Indianapolis crimes rates from 
2000 to 2010 and comparing the crime incidents to neighboring communities.  The 
downtown crime rates for Indianapolis showed an 18.2% increase in crimes against 
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persons from 2000-2010, and crimes against property decreased by 5.3% in downtown 
Indianapolis.     
The West Indianapolis neighborhood and Near Eastside neighborhood crime rates 
were also examined to compare to the downtown crime rates.  West Indianapolis, located 
directly west of the central business district, has the highest concentration of industrial 
parks within the city.  West Indianapolis experienced a 35% increase in crimes against 
persons and a 78% increase in crimes against property from 2000 to 2010.  West 
Indianapolis has a general reputation as a high crime neighborhood and has one of the 
highest crime rates in the Indianapolis Metropolitan      
_________________________________________________________ 
Table 13.  Downtown Indianapolis and  
Neighboring Community Areas Crime Rates 
_________________________________________________________ 
                                                    2000                             2010                  Percent Change 
Downtown 
Indianapolis crimes 
against persons 
280 331 +18.2% 
Downtown 
Indianapolis crimes 
against property 
1,812 1,715 +5.3% 
West Indianapolis 
crimes against 
persons 
663 896 +35.1%  
West Indianapolis 
crimes against 
property 
754 1,347 +78.6%  
Near Eastside 
Indianapolis crimes 
against persons 
1,192 728 -38.9%  
Near Eastside 
Indianapolis crimes 
against property 
2,238 2,912 +30.1%  
 (Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Crime Analysis Section) 
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Police Department area.  The Near Eastside has been a target of numerous urban renewal 
projects since the 1950s, and is more diverse than other neighborhoods in the 
Indianapolis metro area.  The neighborhood experienced a 38.9% decrease in crimes 
against persons, which is consistent with national trends.  However, the neighborhood 
had a 30% increase in property crimes from 2000-2010.  When comparing crime rates in 
Downtown Indianapolis to the neighboring communities there are similarities as well as 
differences.  Both neighboring areas show increases in property crimes while Downtown 
Indianapolis experienced a decrease, while for property crimes, Downtown Indianapolis 
had an increase, and there were increase and decrease in east and west side 
neighborhoods respectively.     
Crime rates in the city of Detroit were examined next.  Unfortunately, specific 
spatial crime data for Detroit were not available.  The only crime data available for the 
year 2000 was the National Neighborhood Crime Study and only for census tract 5208, 
which encompasses half of the sampled area.  Therefore the comparison was only 
conducted for that particular census tract.  The city of Detroit had a 23.2% decrease in 
crimes against persons and a 35% decrease in crimes against property from 2000 to 2010.   
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_________________________________________________________ 
Table 14.  Detroit Crime Rates (City of Detroit vs. Census Tract 5208) 
_________________________________________________________ 
                                                      2000                             2012              Percent Change 
Crimes against 
persons (Detroit) 
22,112 16,973 -23.2%  
Crimes against 
property (Detroit) 
73,649 47,809 -35%  
Crimes against 
persons (Census 
Tract 5208) 
247 429 +73.6%  
Crimes against 
property (Census 
Tract 5208) 
2,783 2,328 -16.3%  
(Uniform Crime Report 2000 & 2010, ESRI Community Analyst &                                  
National Neighborhood Crime Study) 
 
However, in tract 5208, crimes against persons increased by 73.6% while crimes 
against property had a 16.3% decrease.  Detroit did have the highest surveillance average 
of all examined cities.  Detroit also had an active central business district neighborhood 
watch program which encompasses the majority of Downtown Detroit.   
Both Chicago and Detroit had high surveillance and access restriction scores and 
when compared to the large decrease in crimes against property in both cities, it could be 
argued that security zones exhibiting intense access restrictions and surveillance 
measures have affected property crime rates. 
When comparing Tier I downtown Chicago to Tier II Downtown Indianapolis, the 
Loop had a 43% decrease in property crime compared to Indianapolis’ decrease of 5.3%.  
In fact, the Chicago Loop exceeded the national average decrease in crimes against 
property by 23.8%.  Given the significantly higher behavioral, surveillance, and access 
security zones scores in Chicago, it could be argued that property crime rates are affected 
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by these security measures.  On the other hand, Indianapolis had an 18.2% increase for 
crimes against persons, while Chicago experienced a 7.8% increase for crimes against 
persons, which suggests that security zones appear more effective in reducing property 
crime compared to crimes against persons in both Tier 1 and II cities. 
Economic Activity 
In order to assess changes in economic activity in the Tier I and Tier II security 
zones, Class A office space rental rates within the security zones were compared to those 
of neighboring community areas.  Class A office space is defined as desirable investment 
grade properties and they command the highest rents or sale prices.  Class A office 
buildings also tend to be architectural or historical landmarks and the focus of potential 
terrorist attacks.  
_________________________________________________________ 
Table 15.  Chicago Office Space Rental Rates (per square foot) 
_________________________________________________________ 
                                                  2000                             2012                 Percent Change 
Central Loop $31.11 $28.53 -8.2%  
Near West Side  $33.85 $30.43 -10.1%  
Near South Side $36.33 $27.75 -23.6%  
Near North Side $30.01 $28.82 -3.9%  
 (Costar Property, NAI Hiffman, Julien J. Studley Inc. Crain Communications, & 
Cushman and Wakefield) 
           
 Chicago’s central loop experienced an 8.2% decrease in rental rates from 2000 to 
2012.  The Near West Side, Near South Side, and Near North side saw decreases of 
10.1%, 25.2%, and 3.9% respectively.  The average decrease in rental rates of all three 
neighboring community areas was a 13%.  Briggs (2005) argued that as security zones 
increase within the urban core, there is a corresponding decentralization of businesses 
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and agencies into outlying areas.  Moreover, this phenomenon would lead to higher 
vacancy rates and lower rental rates within the security zones in the central business 
districts.  However, with the exception of the near North Side, it appears rental rates have 
declined less within the central business district of Chicago, where security zones are 
focused, when compared to neighboring community areas.  This also suggests that the 
increased social control measures have affected the economic activity within the security 
zones.   
 Turing to the Tier II cities, Downtown Indianapolis office rental space rates were 
compared against suburban office rental space rates from 2000 to 2012.  From 2000 to 
2012, downtown Indianapolis saw a 3.9% increase in office space rental rates from 2000 
_________________________________________________________ 
Table 16.  Indianapolis Office Space Rental Rates (psf) 
_________________________________________________________ 
                    2000                   2012       Percent Change 
Downtown 
Indianapolis  
$17.58 $18.27 +3.9%  
Suburban 
 Indianapolis  
$17.90 $17.10 -4.4%  
 (Indianapolis Downtown, Inc., CBRE Group & Cassidy and Turley Commercial Real 
Estate Services) 
 
through 2012.  When looking at suburban Indianapolis office space rental rates from 
2000 to 2010, there was a 4.4% decrease in rental rates.   
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_________________________________________________________ 
Table 17.  Downtown Detroit Office Space Rental Rates (per Square foot) 
_________________________________________________________ 
                               2000                                   2012          Percent Change 
$23.59 $22.63 -4%  
(CBRE Group) 
 
Downtown Detroit’s office space rental rates were obtained from 2000 to 2012.  
Unfortunately, comparisons of surrounding areas for the year 2000 were not available.  
Downtown Detroit’s office space rental rates have decreased by 4% from 2000 to 2012.  
When comparing Chicago’s central business districts office rental rates to the Tier II rates 
of Indianapolis and Detroit, the findings are mixed.  Indianapolis rental rates increased, 
while those of Chicago and Detroit decreased.  
Given the crime prevention through environmental design and defensible space 
aspects of security zones, it is interesting to note that where they are most concentrated, 
they appear to be attracting residents and have stable commercial office space rental 
rates.  In fact, rental rates have increased in downtown Indianapolis, while suburban 
office space rental rates have decreased.  With the combination of Chicago and 
Indianapolis’ central businesses districts attracting residents and commercial office rental 
rates are increasing, especially in the case of Downtown Indianapolis, it appears that the 
central businesses districts may be undergoing gentrification.  In fact, the security zones 
may be providing a sense of safety and security, therefore negating Boddy’s (2008) 
architecture of dis-assurance argument and supporting the argument that security zones 
are social mechanisms operating within behavior settings that can either restrict or 
facilitate demographic, social, and economic activities.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Previous studies have illustrated anti-terror security present in major metropolitan 
cities like New York (Marcuse, 2006), London (Coaffee, 2009), Washington D.C. 
(Benton-Short, 2007) and Jerusalem (Savitch, 2008), however none have conveyed the 
spatial extent of security zones as was done in this study.  Nemeth (2010) and Hollander 
and Whifield (2010) have identified the presence of security zones.  However, they have 
not provided the spatial extent and intensity of security zones on public space as was 
done in this study.  Nemeth (2010) and Hollander and Whifield (2010) did not use IDW 
interpolation or Sampson’s ecometric methodology to study this phenomena.  Nor did 
they evaluate demographic, social, and economic activity occurring within and around 
the sampled security zones.  This dissertation contributes to empirical studies on security 
zones within public urban space by examining urban fortification and the spatial extent 
and intensity of security zones as well as their influence on public space.  And although 
the idea of using some form of spatial arrangements as tools for crime control has a long 
established history, the presence of physical security zones within urban areas has 
increased since the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks (Marcuse, 2006; Coaffee, 2009).  
When walking in a major U.S. city, it does not take long to notice blast-proof planters, 
bollards, or reinforced street lamps, while being monitored by countless CCTV cameras.     
To better understand the emerging phenomena of security zones and fortification 
of urban public space, this dissertation analyzed security zones located in the central 
business districts of Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis.  This study was able to identify 
the spatial extent and intensity of security zones located in the three cities.  The intensity 
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of which thee cities utilized the security zone variables of behavior, surveillance, and 
access restrictions was also identified.   
This analysis determined Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit, with substantially 
smaller populations and density levels than larger global cities such as New York and 
London, (both of have both experienced terrorist attacks), have fortified buildings, areas, 
and neighborhoods as well as restricted public space in their civic and financial districts.  
However, each city employed security zones in different forms.  Chicago had many 
smaller security zones, but focused more on access restrictions and target hardening.  
Indianapolis had less security zones and employed cost effective behavioral controls.  
Detroit focused heavily on surveillance measures and had a vast network of CCTV 
cameras.           
Moreover, buildings housing government entities and financial institutions were 
the most likely to have a security zone in the surrounding area.  Office buildings, 
universities, and businesses typically did not have security zones in their general vicinity.  
It was found that publicly owned buildings, on average, had a higher security zone score 
when compared to privately owned buildings.  More specifically, federal government 
entities, in all three cities, scored the highest for the security zone criteria.  The most 
common type of security zone criteria present for government entities are surveillance 
and access restrictions.           
The most frequently observed behavioral variable throughout this study was 
prohibitive signage.  These signs mainly prohibited public loitering in certain areas of the 
building.  For surveillance the CCTV camera was the most observed.  FEMA (2011) 
recommends the use of CCTV cameras as a low case and moderately effective means to 
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deter criminal activity.  The bollard and crash rated planter were the most observed 
access restriction.  These defensive measures provide the greatest amount of protection to 
the building and its inhabitants (FEMA, 2011).    
Seventeen buildings in the central Loop exhibited a security zone.  Detroit and 
Chicago had fifteen and thirteen buildings, respectively.  Detroit and Indianapolis both 
had significant areas that did not have a security zone present.  Chicago’s security surface 
was more intense than the other cities.  Adapting the observable security zone criteria and 
imputing the data into ArcGIS and ArcScene, this study has been able to display a 
phenomenon of public and private fortification of space that is present in Downtown 
Detroit, Indianapolis’ central business district, and Chicago’s central Loop.      
As previously noted, Sampson (2003) has posited that social mechanisms 
operating within behavior settings can either restrict or facilitate demographic, social, and 
economic activities.  This dissertation has argued that security zones are in effect 
empirical measures of Sampson’s concept of social mechanisms and that it is important 
to determine to what extent security zones identified in the three cities of interest in this 
study have affected the demographic, social and economic activities within them.  The 
impact of enhanced social control measures on the demographic, social and economic 
activities of a Tier I (Chicago) and two Tier II cities (Indianapolis and Detroit) were 
assessed by examining population, crime and office rental rate changes from 
approximately 2000 to 2010.     
When comparing the population, crime rates, and office space rental rates of the 
sample areas several findings stood out.  The first was the population of the sample areas.  
Even though overt anti-terrorism security measures are present, within the central 
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business districts of Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit, city dwellers are not deterred 
from residing within an area which has a high potential for a future terrorist strike.  The 
city of Chicago had a total population loss of approximately 7%, yet the central Loop 
experienced a 128% increase in population from 2000 to 2010.  Indianapolis had a 
population increase of about 5%; however Downtown Indianapolis experienced nearly a 
70% increase of residents.  Detroit had an overall population loss of 25%, but Downtown 
Detroit only experienced a 20% loss.  Boddy’s (2008) architecture of dis-assurance 
argument is questioned with these findings.   
It is also important to note that social activities evidenced significant changes 
within the security zones of the three cities of interest in this study.  Crimes against 
property decrease in all three sample areas.  Chicago’s Loop experienced nearly a 43% 
reduction of property crimes from 2001 to 2011, and the reduction in property crime was 
greater in the security zones than the surrounding communities in the Chicago 
metropolitan area.  Property crime rates also differed by areas of Indianapolis.  When 
examining the surrounding neighborhoods, property crimes increased dramatically, while 
Downtown Indianapolis experienced a decrease in property crimes.  Downtown Detroit 
also experienced a decrease in crimes against property.   
These findings suggest that the implementation of security zones may be a factor 
in the reduction of property crimes.  Access restrictions, in particular, may be more 
effective in reducing property crimes as was observed in the city of Chicago with its 
significant decrease.  Security zones appear to be manipulating behavior settings by 
imposing access restrictions, behavioral controls, and surveillance measures.  This 
finding lends support to Routine Activities theory in that target hardening and increased 
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surveillance activities within these security zones may have had an effect on property 
crimes.  Crime prevention through environmental design and defensible space measures, 
which are adapted into security zones, appear to be working to reduce property crimes in 
the sampled urban areas.  These findings also support an extension of Sampson’s (2003) 
argument that social mechanisms such as security zones may influence social activities 
occurring within them.      
To better understand the effect of security zones on economic activities, 
commercial office space rental rates in Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit were 
compared.  From 2000 to 2012, Chicago’s central Loop only had an 8.2% decrease in 
rental rates.  The average loss for the surrounding community areas was 12.5%.  
Downtown Indianapolis had an increase in rental rates in the same time period, while 
suburban Indianapolis had a 4.4% decrease of rental rates.  Downtown Detroit had a 4% 
decrease in rental rates, an again there was a lack of available data to compare this 
finding.  These downtown areas present a number of high value and high profile targets 
for potential terrorists.  However, the comparisons show these downtown business 
districts are exhibiting population increases, a reduction in property crimes, and have a 
lower decline in Class A commercial office space rental rates when compared to 
surrounding neighborhoods.  These findings again nullify Boddy’s architecture of dis-
assurance argument.           
Each district studied had no more than 27% of urban space secured, 
demonstrating that the majority of urban space in these cities are still open and accessible 
to the public with limited restrictions in place.  While this research shows that 
fortification is present, and has increased in response to terrorist threats around the world, 
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these cities have not reacted by becoming militarized zones where every action is under 
strict control.  For the most part, individuals can still freely interact within public city 
space.  
This study responded to Sampson’s call to utilize ecometric research and the 
integration of GPS and GIS techniques into sociological research, and in doing so has 
identified the spatial extent and intensity of security zones in these three cities.  However, 
further research is needed to better understand the long term impact of security zones and 
their effect on urban public and private space.  With the installation of security measures 
in urban public space, questions are raised about the association between security 
measures and fear.  More specifically, further research could be done to test Boddy’s 
(2008) belief that anti-terrorism security measures are creating an aura of dis-assurance 
within the city.  Now that the extent and intensity of security zones have been 
established, future researchers may want to examine if fear among city dwellers is 
heightened when entering or residing within areas exhibiting security zones.  Using the 
research conducted in this study, the concept of fear could be examined by studying 
reactions of people within mapped security zones.  This will help identify if people feel 
more or less safe with these visible security zones.  This would be important data in 
maintaining a thriving economy in these areas that can attract local residents and tourists 
as well as maintain safety.   
Researchers may also want to focus on the long term effects of security zones on 
people residing or working within security zones.  Graham (2007) argues that a culture of 
fear is driving efforts to fortify U.S. cities and that the constant barrage of the 24/7 news 
cycle only fuels citizens paranoia.  Therefore, assessing the effect of media exposure on 
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urban residents in these areas of high risk for terrorist attacks could be a possible addition 
to future studies on behavioral settings such as security zones.   
Future research should also include in depth interviews to better determine other 
concerns that may be associated with security zones.  Interviews with respondents might 
reveal additional causal factors of security zones that are not currently addressed in 
existing literature.  A future study could assess which security methods are more or less 
acceptable to people within urban areas of varying degrees of risk to terrorist attacks and 
their proximity to security zones.  
There are limitations of this study which must be noted.  Future studies could 
improve upon these findings by increasing the number of sampled cities.  Eventually, a 
database could be created for every city identified by the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Urban Area Security Initiative List to be at risk for a potential terrorist attack.  
This database could also be comprised of more measures of demographic, social, and 
economic activities.  Such measures could include: race, age, tourism and vacancy rates, 
and a more specific breakdown of crime rates.  By identifying more measures and 
increasing the sample size, future research will be able to go beyond a descriptive 
analysis of the security zones of these three cities to account for the variation in levels of 
behavioral controls, access restrictions, and surveillance measures by within and between 
cities.           
However, this study provides a starting point for future researchers to better 
quantify the existing phenomenon of security zones.  This type of innovative 
methodology, incorporating the latest technological advances can be used as a baseline 
for longitudinal research for security zones existing within Chicago, Indianapolis, and 
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Detroit.  Future studies will be able to detect if security zones are becoming more or less 
restrictive to surrounding urban space in these three cities, as well as other Tier I and Tier 
II cities across the United States.   
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